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Abstract
By illuminating the complexities of 1920s American society, college football serves as a
remarkably insightful cultural device. At the commencement of the decade, a national business
community – one that had been developing since the late nineteenth century – appeared to have
come to fruition. The more connected nature of the country served to homogenize the United
States economically, politically, and even socially. Citizens who had once lived autonomously
found themselves more interconnected with neighboring regions of the country, and thus
increasingly defined by national characteristics. This served as an internal crisis of sorts because
regional identity operated as a unique and crucial component of individual Americans’ personal
identities. In this atmosphere, it makes sense that when college football nationalized in the 1920s
the sport would follow the same pattern – a diminishment of regionalism as the sport expanded.
However, the opposite occurred as supporters’ ties with their regional football communities
strengthened when encountered with competition from outside teams.
This study utilizes the Walter Camp All-American football team, the Southern Methodist
University football team, and the 1929 Carnegie Report on college athletics to explore the
growth and nationalization of the game during the decade. This thesis concludes that, by the end
of the 1920s, changes in college football and American society allowed for a more connected
national football community as opposed to the regional disassociation that existed prior to the
decade, while at the same time reinforcing and even strengthening regional identity by placing it
within a competitive national context. What the growth of college football illustrates is not just a
simple transition from isolated communities to a homogenous nation, but rather, how regions
became more important as the nation unified. This study complicates the traditional notion that
diverse localities easily eroded in the face of a more structured and nationalized 1920s American
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society. Furthermore, by examining a variety of crucial personal actions associated with 1920s
college football, this study demonstrates that individual supporters, not an uncontrollable
environment or institutions connected to the game, made regional football communities an
integral component of the sport.
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Introduction
Prior to a 1924 road game against the University of Minnesota Gophers, Vanderbilt
football coach Dan McGugin knew that he needed to seize his team’s attention on the task at
hand. The contest in Minneapolis presented the southern team with a unique opportunity, and the
soft-spoken coach understood this as he gathered his team together prior to the game. Minnesota
was fresh off an upset of a highly regarded University of Illinois team, and thus carried a
considerable amount of momentum and national publicity into the contest.1 If McGugin’s squad
could pull off an unexpected win against the Gophers, Vanderbilt could acquire their own
widespread exposure. With the players focused solely on their coach, McGugin began an
emotional speech that evoked much more than triumph in a football contest.
Men, those people in the stands out there haven't heard of Southern football. When they
think about the South, they think about the Civil War – they think about pain, suffering,
and death. Many people have no idea of what Southern manhood is all about. Today we
can show them. When your mothers looked on you sleeping in your cradles twenty years
ago, they wondered when the time would come when you could bring honor to the South.
That time has arrived!
Vanderbilt went on to win the game sixteen to zero.2
The “bring honor to the South” speech proves interesting on many levels. McGugin
strays from turning the contest into the Civil War reincarnated – not once, does the coach
mention a contentious North. Rather, the speech focuses on the athletes correcting a misinformed
narrative about their home and bringing national respect to the South. Vanderbilt transforms
from a football team into representatives of their native region determined to prove not only to
the spectators in the stands, but also to the nation, that southern football, and thus the South, was
relevant and dignified. Of course, a football game served as the primary objective of the meeting,
1

For national attention of this accomplishment, see: "Comment on Current Events in Sports." New York Times, Nov
17, 1924.
2
Lawrence Wells, ed. Introduction to Football Powers of the South (Oxford, MS: Sports Yearbook Company,
1983), v.
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but when Vanderbilt became the South’s team, the sport became an instrument to obtain national
dignity and respect, while at the same time reinforcing regional pride. Because of sports’
competitive nature, becoming part of college football’s national conversation did not mean a loss
of regional identity, but rather a strengthening of it – the nationalization of collegiate football
perpetuated regionalism. This process illustrates the cultural power of college football.
Furthermore, by suggesting that a victory over the Midwest foe would lead to respect, the
Vanderbilt coach admits to Southern football lacking national appreciation – a respected power
would not need to earn recognition. McGugin was correct in his assessment. Prior to the 1920s,
the Northeast possessed a near-monopoly on college football notoriety. The proponents of the
sport deemed the Northeastern schools, especially the “Big Three” of Harvard, Princeton, and
Yale, as the elite class of collegiate football.3 However, at the beginning of the decade a shift
began to occur, as teams further west began to receive the attention of Northeast sportswriters,
and receive recognition as being on par or better than the East’s finest teams. The first chapter of
this study demonstrates this homogenization of collegiate football in the 1920s as the result of
the individual efforts of coaches, sportswriters, and other institutions rather than the product of
uncontrollable factors of American society. Specifically, the chapter analyzes the nationalization
of the sport through the Walter Camp All-American team and various intersectional contests
between teams from the East and the West Coast.
Of particular interest to the nationalization of the sport was the westward movement of
the “frontier” of college football. Prior to the decade, college football supporters deemed teams
from the Midwest as “western” opponents, and many of these teams associated themselves with
3

nd

Richard Davies, Sports in American Life: A History, 2 edition, (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell,
2012), 47. As Richard Davies notes, as college football appeared on more campuses in the 1890s, “the dominance
of Eastern elite schools was being threatened by powerful `Western’ teams, namely the Universities of Michigan,
Minnesota, and Chicago.” These powerful Midwest football teams were the exception, and the power was still
largely held by the teams in the East.
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the Western Conference.4 By the 1920s, as teams from the Midwest began to play various squads
from the West Coast, sportswriters referred to teams such as Notre Dame and Ohio State as
representatives of the East.5 The subtle change in the headlines of American sports sections
illuminates the nationalization of the sport.
Because of college football’s coast-to-coast expansion, 1920s intersectional contests,
such as the 1924 matchup between Vanderbilt and Minnesota, proved significant. 6 These highly
publicized collegiate contests occurred previously, but in the post-war period, the games became
more frequent and developed into an indispensible component of college football. Newspapers
took notice of the public’s affection for the games and regularly generated headlines endorsing
the cross-country affairs.7 Football promoters went as far as to call for an “intersectional
Saturday” to be played one weekend during every season – four eastern teams would travel west
and four teams from the Midwest would go East. According to those advocating the contests, the
games would provide a more certain “satisfaction in knowing who are the real leading teams.”8
The desire to obtain regional pride through college football was not unique to this
particular decade, but by the 1920s, the altered state of college football perpetuated regional

4

Murray Sperber, Shake Down the Thunder: The Creation of Notre Dame Football (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1993), 19. Murray Sperber refers to the Big Ten by its former name: the Western Conference.
5
For Ohio State as the eastern representative in the 1921 Tournament East-West football game, see: Harry M.
Grayson, “California Wins Gridiron Classic,” Oregonian, Jan 2, 1921.
For Notre Dame referred to as an eastern opponent, see "NOTRE DAME ROUTS STANFORD BY 27-10." New York
Times, Jan. 2, 1925. These headlines display the subtle movement of the “frontier” of college football.
6
In the 1920s, Newspapers consistently referred to these contests between teams from different regions of the
country as “intersectional.” For an example of this, see The New York Times article reporting of Vanderbilt’s 1924
victory over Minnesota. "Vanderbilt Beats Minnesota, 16-0." New York Times, Nov 23, 1924.
7
For the “proliferation” of intersectional contests in the 1920s, see Michael Oriard, King Football (Chapel Hill, NC:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 7.
8
Raymond Schmidt, Shaping College Football: The Transformation of an American Sport, 1919-1930 (Syracuse, NY:
University of Syracuse Press, 2007), 27-28. Source originally found in an uncredited and undated 1920 newspaper
clipping from the Camp Papers, Yale University Archives.
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identity. 9 As college football historian Michael Oriard notes, “Every community had its own
football culture, shaped by its own and its region’s history, its resources, its civic aspirations, and
countless other factors….” These regional football cultures became an identity for its local
supporters, and the various styles of play associated with particular sections yielded a unique
characteristic for which a local football community could distinguish itself from other areas of
the country.10 The second chapter of this study explores the creation of a Southwestern football
identity through the rise of Southern Methodist University football in the 1920s. With the Dallas
community providing ardent support, the SMU football team not only transformed from
perennial losers to a nationally recognized power by 1928, but they also directly influenced the
growth and respect of Southwest football.
Historian Robert Wiebe describes nineteenth century American society as vaguely
connected “island communities.” 11 Prior to the 1920s, local college football factions existed
much in the same manner. Beside the occasional intersectional matchup, various regional
football communities endured with minimal interaction. In part, the disassociation was due to the
delayed introduction of the sport to various regions and the sparse population in certain sections
of the country, but by the end of World War I, the game’s popularity and skill had spread.
However, the sport lacked a core – there was no unifying aspect of collegiate football that could
bring the local communities together.12 In the 1920s, as the game homogenized, the efforts of
various regions to garner unbiased notoriety served as an adhesive force. The desire for national

9

Edward Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),
310-315. As Edward Ayers explains in The Promise of the New South, team sports, including college football,
provided a new source of regional pride for Southerners in the late nineteenth century.
10
Michael Oriard, King Football, 86. Oriard mentions that the Midwest became known “for rock-‘em, sock-‘em
power football, the Southwest for wide-open passing, and the South for fierce combativeness.”
11
Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), xiii.
12
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 12. Wiebe mentions that the United States was a society lacking a “core” in the late
nineteenth century.
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recognition from collegiate football sportswriters became a common goal. Furthermore, the
ambition to become college football’s national champion united the disparate regions in a
common purpose. Previously, the northeastern champion essentially constituted as college
football’s national champion and a regional championship served as the ultimate goal for most
other teams – in the 1920s a national championship became a possibility for teams from all
regions. Through unified objectives, isolated regions became part of a national collegiate football
community.
In the 1920s, sectional pride proved to be of the utmost importance – even ranking above
fierce intrastate rivalries. Auburn students demonstrated this change in collegiate football as
students packed the campus auditorium to cheer on rival Alabama in the Crimson Tide’s 1926
Rose Bowl game versus Washington. Since 1907, the two Alabama schools had severed athletic
relations, yet regional pride eclipsed the tumultuous relationship between the universities.13
The expansive national football community of the 1920s integrated the formerly isolated
localities, thus creating a regional crisis. To root for the success of one’s school proved the only
concern when hope of a conference championship and respect from regional peers was the end
goal. As part of a national football community, the supporter’s school became one of many
across the country and their identity with a region intensified. When a team from a respective
region combated a squad from another, the collective regional football identity was at stake. In
this sense, the evolution of a more vast football landscape – one played in all sections of the
country – served as a heterogeneous force for football regions.14 It was also in this national
college football landscape that the idiosyncrasies of the regional community became most
13

Andrew Doyle, “Turning the Tide: College Football and Southern Progressivism,” Southern Cultures, Vol. 3, No. 3
(1997): 32. All athletic relations, not just football, had been severed after the 1907 season.
14
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 133-134. Wiebe mentions the difficult that arose in the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as communities had difficulty distinguishing themselves from others in a
more homogenized United States.
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apparent, as they compared style of play, fan support, and skill to rival regions in order to
determine sectional supremacy.15 Thus, as the individual college football fan in the 1920s
became a smaller piece of a larger puzzle, it made sense to support the regional football
community vigorously.
Amidst college football’s rapid growth, the notion to win at all costs proved truer than
ever. The transformative decade witnessed increased efforts of illegal recruiting and athletic
subsidies by alumni, boosters, and even university employed athletic administrators in order to
gain an advantage on opponents. Following numerous abuses toward the amateur ideals of the
college game, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching investigated the
game’s impact on the academic integrity of America’s universities. Through the analysis of
various controversies and the 1929 Carnegie Report on athletics, chapter three observes regional
football proponents’ efforts to endorse their local schools and conferences as “clean” in respect
to other sections of the country. Furthermore, the debate surrounding the publication of the report
and other controversies displays the attempts of elite, eastern academics to quell their fading
significance in an increasingly modern and professional American society.
By the 1920s, everyday life in the United States had come to be characterized by what
historian Robert Wiebe defined as “bureaucratic orientation” – “the values of continuity and
regularity, functionality and rationality, administration and management set the form of problems
and outlined their alternate solutions.”16 With actions such as the implementation of time zones,
enforcement of the English language in schools, and thriving transcontinental railroad lines, the
United States was a more homogenized nation economically, politically, and at times socially.
15

Edward Ayers and Peter Onuf, introduction to All Over the Map: Rethinking American Regions, Edward Ayers,
Patricia Nelson Limerick, Stephen Nissenbaum, and Peter Onuf. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,
1996), 8. While not particularly discussing college football, Ayers and Onuf are speaking of regions in a general
sense.
16
Wiebe, The Search for Order, 295.
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Despite a more connected American society, the rigid ideals of Wiebe’s “bureaucratic
orientation” failed to permeate a powerful and intimate force: personal identity. In order to cope
with the loss of autonomy that arrived with a more plural nation, Americans drew upon that
which made them feel unique: regional identity.
In a more homogenous, post-World War I United States, the importance of regional
identity did not disappear. This study is evidence that, in the context of college football,
regionalism was as important as ever. Local college football fans sought distinction in a national
college football landscape and providing regional support propelled unique characteristics of
particular localities. Furthermore, the strong desire to equate one’s region with superiority
explains some of the irrational behavior often associated with college football. Self-pride and
bragging rights came with the victory of one’s conference or local team, while every loss yielded
a sense of inferiority and a diminishment in respect of a local football community. College
football supporters’ ardent efforts to avoid the latter provide reasoning for the ever-present
dangers of commercialism and corruption in the amateur sport.
Considering the public’s longstanding fascination with college football, it is quite
remarkable that relatively few scholarly works use the game to examine 1920s American society.
Moreover, historians who have analyzed the period through the lens of college football often
touch upon the issues as part of a multi-decade study. While such scholarship provides
wonderful insight, the expansive nature of the works does not allow for analysis of the nuances
associated with the sport and American society, culture, and politics during the decade.17

17

John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 2000). Watterson provides an excellent comprehensive study of college football, but the breadth of the
study does not allow for close discussion of the important issues of the 1920s, such as the regional identity college
football provided the American citizenry.
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The few studies that solely examine topics within the 1920s either fail to discuss the
affect the local nature of college football had upon American personal identity, or they discuss
solely how one region was impacted by the growth of the game during the period.18 This study
intends to accomplish both, as it will examine how the nationalization of 1920s college football
affected individual Americans’ regional identity in multiple sections of the country, rather than
focus on how the game affected teams and other organizations associated with the sport. In order
to examine the importance of a local identity to the 1920s American public, agency of the
individual supporter, coach, and athlete will take precedence over institutions.
One such study that adequately examines the local nature of college football, albeit from
the 1920s through the 1950s, is Michael Oriard’s King Football. My study does not intend to
challenge Oriard’s conclusions; rather the objective is to extend the conversation by analyzing
the influence of individual action on 1920s college football regionalism.19 By examining the
Walter Camp All-American football team, the rise in prominence of the Southern Methodist
football team, and the 1929 Carnegie Report, this study will show that it was individual action
that generated the importance of regionalism during the decade. Individual supporters, not an
uncontrollable environment or institutions associated with the game, made regional football
communities an integral component of the sport.
Michael Oriard, King Football: Sport and Spectacle in the Golden Age of Radio and Newsreels, Movies and
Magazines, the Weekly and the Daily Press (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Michael
Oriard discusses the 1920s as part of a multi-decade study as well.
18
Schmidt explores the growth of the game to various regions and the impact this had on the popularity of
intersectional games, but the study does not delve into the impact the growth of the game had upon regional
identity, as it is focused more upon the transformations ongoing in college football rather than the cultural
changes of American society.
Doyle, “Turning the Tide: College Football and Southern Progressivism,” 28-51. Doyle’s study explores the Southern
progressivism through the context of Alabama’s participation in the 1926 Rose Bowl. The historian’s focuses on
southern history and thus the national impact of regionalism upon all Americans is not explored.
19
Oriard, King Football, 65-100. Oriard’s valuable work discusses the manner in which college football fans utilize
their local teams to promote regional identity. However, it does not fully describe the force that instigated the
strengthening of regionalism in the national football community: the individual citizenry. This is due to the
historian exploring the Americanizing role of college football through the media – an institution.
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1920s regional football communities were socially constructed territories developed to
meet individuals’ desire to feel unique amidst a homogenizing nation. On the other hand,
universities, athletic conferences, and the media primarily promoted the existence of regional
football communities because of the financial opportunities available through intersectional
contests. Thus, it is important to credit the prevalence of regionalism in 1920s college football
not with institutions such as the media, but rather with the individual efforts of an American
public that sought to make local football communities matter in a more national college football
landscape.

9

Chapter One
The Walter Camp All-American Team and the Growth of West Coast
Football
At the conclusion of the 1922 collegiate football season, Berkeley Daily Gazette sports
editor Don Wiley disappointedly gazed at the annual Walter Camp All-American football team.
The West Coast sportswriter was somewhat pleased that the squad included “Brick” Muller of
his hometown University of California on the first team, but the editor still wrote in the
December 26 issue of the Daily Gazette with a disdainful tone when commenting on the
selections. Wiley sarcastically noted that “despite the fact” Walter Camp – the Yale University
coach who selected the team – “has never been able to see very clearly over the Rockies, the
famous expert gave California a pretty good deal this year.” He continued with his ridiculing
prose, “it would seem that Camp has jazzed things up, by bringing out his binoculars, and taking
a good squint at the Coast products.”1 Wiley was not unique, in the 1920s, one could read the
college football commentary of sportswriters all along the Pacific Coast and discover the same
unimpressed tone.
Why did Wiley and other supporters of West Coast collegiate football display such an
attitude in the decade? Many sports journalists who have commented on the athletic feats of this
period have deemed the 1920s the “Golden Age of Sports,” yet Wiley and his western
companions seemed to view the situation of college football as far from “golden” in 1922.2
However, by the end of the decade, many national college football experts considered the West
as on par and perhaps even superior to other regions in football prowess. The collegiate game

1

Don Wiley, “Sport Talk,” Berkeley Daily Gazette, Dec. 26, 1922.
For the 1920s as the “Golden Age of Sports” see: Grantland Rice, The Tumult and The Shouting (New York: A.S.
Barnes and Company, 1954); Allison Danzig, The History of American Football: Its Great Teams, Players, and
Coaches (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956); Alison Danzig, and Peter Brandwein, eds. Sport’s Golden
Age: A Close-Up of the Fabulous Twenties (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948).
2

10

had grown drastically, and the respect and notoriety provided to West Coast football by the
decade’s end demonstrated this development. A close examination of college football in the
1920s displays that the expansion of the sport into a homogenous institution was not an organic
event due to the uncontrollable factors of American society, but rather the result of the individual
efforts of coaches, sportswriters, and institutions.
Walter Camp selected his first All-American college football team in 1888.3 Though this
imaginary squad may seem no more than a side note to the action that took place during the
preceding regular season, this could not be further from the truth for the chosen athletes and their
schools. A selection to the Walter Camp All-American team provided “the highest accolade to be
won” in the college game.4 A majority of the sport’s experts and fans regarded Camp’s team as
the authoritative determinant of the finest collegiate football players in the country. After Camp’s
unexpected death in 1923, the New York Times noted that although multiple outlets began
choosing their own All-American teams, “Mr. Camp’s selections remained the conclusive word
on the subject.”5
Walter Camp is widely regarded as the “Father of American football,” and the supreme
respect entitled upon him by his peers, past and present, largely stems from his success as the
coach of Yale University and his influential contribution to the initial rules of the sport. Even
more significant for the 1920s, Camp created service-football programs during World War I that

3

John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University
Press, 2000), 21.
Harold Claassen, Ronald Encyclopedia of Football (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), 663. Though
Camp is consistently determined as the primary selector, there is some controversy on the subject. Harold
Claassen writes in the Ronald Encyclopedia of Football that Whitney have selected the All-American teams for the
first nine years of its existence. 1897 was the first year in which it can be conclusively determined that Camp solely
selected the team and by 1898 he began selecting the team annually for Collier’s magazine.
4
Michael Oriard, Reading Football: How the Popular Press Created an American Spectacle (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 47.
5
“Walter Camp Found Dead In Hotel Here…,” New York Times, March 15, 1925.
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introduced the game to a multitude of young American men.6 Camp’s annual All-American
selections proved equally, perhaps even more, important to universities’ athletic programs and
football-crazed alumni and fans. A selection on the team, especially the prestigious first-team,
brought valuable publicity to a university’s football program and legitimated its team and
athletes.
Due to Camp’s obligations at Yale, he rarely viewed teams and players from outside of
the Northeast. In the first couple of decades of the All-American team’s existence, this limitation
served as a non-issue due to the East Coast monopolization of nearly all reputable collegiate
teams and talent, but by the 1920s universities from across the country possessed adequately
coached football teams. The one-dimensional selections led to critical reviews and scornful
claims that the Yale coach looked no further than out his office window to determine the athletes
for his squad.7
As universities on the West Coast began to reemphasize college football after World
War I, Camp’s perceivably biased selections became increasingly controversial. Western football
advocates felt the collegiate teams in their region matched the skills of their eastern brethren and
suspected Camp’s favoritism left deserving athletes from the West off the team. Every time a
western player failed to appear on Camp’s team, the exclusions served as missed opportunities
for notoriety and respect.
There were certainly factors that proved instrumental to the national exclusion of the
West Coast game at the beginning of the twentieth century. According to the 1900 census, only
four million people inhabited Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, and those states bordering the

6

Michael Oriard, King Football: Sport and Spectacle in the Golden Age of Radio and Newsreels, Movies and
Magazines, the Weekly and the Daily Press (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 3.
7
Charles Fountain, Sportswriter: The Life and Times of Grantland Rice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),
208.
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Pacific Ocean.8 This scarcity in population undoubtedly inhibited the number of quality athletes
west of the Rockies. Furthermore, the California schools unsuccessful experiment with rugby
from 1906-1915 served as an unintentional burden for the West Coast institutions. While the
West avoided football, eastern institutions enhanced the reputation and popularity of their
programs. This western stray from the game proved almost comical to eastern pundits and led to
them imposing a sense of inferiority on West Coast football. The University of Washington
experienced the humiliation first-hand, as their sixty-four game undefeated stretch from 19081916 was never recognized with a national championship due to East Coast perceptions that they
played substandard opponents.9
By the 1920s, the West Coast believed their alleged inferiority was a problem of the past.
The region’s larger schools belonged to the nationally recognized Pacific Coast Conference, and
the Far West possessed the successful University of California “Wonder Teams,” which owned a
record of forty-four wins and zero losses from 1920-1924.”10 The taste of success, along with a
communal environment experienced by West Coast football, instilled a sense of regional pride
that led to a demand for respect in national publications produced by eastern media members.
Success in the form of print served as an opportune outlet for the West to garner respect and
augment the nationalization of college football.11 West Coast sportswriter Jack James pleaded
his regional audience to ignore the national media’s misguided opinions. “Don’t let them tell you
that all the real football played in these United States is centered in and around Cambridge, New

8

Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy, 96-97.
Allison Danzig, The History of American Football: Its Great Teams, Players, and Coaches (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), 183.
10
Ibid., 239. See for “California Wonder Teams.”
11
The University of California football teams received recognition as National Champions by certain outlets in the
1920, ’21, ’22, and ’23 seasons. Despite their flawless records, they were never close to being undisputed
champions. See: Tim Cohane, Great College Football Coaches of the Twenties and Thirties (New Rochelle, NY:
Arlington House, 1973), 175-178.
9
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Haven and Princeton – nor yet in the Big Ten territory,” implored James. “It may have been
once. But not now or hereafter.”12
West Coast football advocates had reason for concern. From 1920-1924, a West Coast
player appeared on Camp’s first team only three times. The three athletes selected were from the
same school, California, and Cal’s Harold “Brick” Muller appeared twice, in 1921 and 1922.13
The lack of Pacific athletes honored by Camp strengthened the perceptions of national football
fans, especially eastern fans, that the sport still lagged on the West Coast.
Western football supporters had no trouble voicing their disapproval toward the AllAmerican selections. After the release of Camp’s 1920 team, the Berkeley Gazette noted that
“once more Walter Camp… comes forward with his selections for mythical first, second, and
third All-American eleven. And once more he fails to name a Pacific coast player to his first
team.”14 The article continued by criticizing anyone who deemed this a true national team,
sarcastically stating that “Outside of (the) district west of the Rockies” Camp has spread his team
geographically. The frustrated member of the western press concluded that Camp seemed
“unaware that they play football in this neck of the woods.” 15
Many national pundits agreed with the 1920 assessment made by the New York Times
that “the mushroom growth of modern football” made the selection process “unbelievably
complicated.”16 A West Coast journalist claimed that Camp’s “selection of an all-America team
these days, instead of giving credit where credit is due, is more likely to work an injustice.” From
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the vantage point of the West, there was no way one man could make worthy selections because
an “individual can watch only 16 teams, at most, play a football season.”17 The western writer’s
point was valid. Camp certainly made the decisions to the best of his abilities, but the game had
grown larger than an individual could cover and one region could contain. Though unintentional,
Camp’s continual decision to select his team without assistance from other knowledgeable
football followers stunted the growth of college football.18
In 1922, the fierce outrage toward the selection process led to the New York Times’
refusal to publish Camp’s team, instead replacing it with “a roll of honor” that consisted of
graduated football players and their achievements since leaving college. This substitution
stemmed largely from “protests… against the practice of selecting players for Camp’s allAmerican eleven. Western delegates in particular opposed… on the ground that football has
developed with such strides and now covers such an immense territory that no individual is
qualified to make a representative selection.”19
New York Times headlines after the release of Camp’s 1920 and 1921 squads surely
enhanced Western resentment. The newspaper observed in 1920 that “Eastern college football
players still form the backbone of the All-American teams selected by Walter Camp,”20 and in
1921, “Eastern football players are more numerous than those of any other one section.”21
Furthermore, Camp saw no issue with his 1923 selections, as in his mind the team showcased, “a
particularly powerful aggregation to use under the most advanced methods of today and under

17

“Sport News and Comment” Oregonian, Jan. 8, 1922, 2.
Claassen, Ronald Encyclopedia of Football, 664. Claassen notes that “Camp was popularly regarded as the sole
originator and sole selector of all the early All-America teams.”
19
“Record of Prominent Graduates Will Take Place of Camp’s All-Star Team,” New York Times, Aug. 13, 1922.
20
Associated Press, “Six Eastern Men On Camp’s Eleven…,” NYT, Dec. 16, 1920.
21
Associated Press, “Camp Ranges Afar For Gridiron Stars…,” NYT, Dec. 21, 1921.
18

15

any and all conditions” – the first team included no West Coast athletes that year.22 Many
football supporters on the West Coast concluded that the selections made by Camp, a man often
attributed with the advancement of college football, stalled the national growth of the sport and
the potential recognition of western universities.
Regional proponents of the West Coast college game viewed intersectional contests as a
substantial opportunity to counter disrespect from eastern pundits. The most prominent of these
regional rivalries was the Tournament East-West football game played annually on New Year’s
Day in Pasadena, California. The contest matched an eastern football power versus the champion
of the West. In the 1921 edition of the game, the University of California’s 28-0 defeat of Ohio
State propelled a sense of pride for many football fans on the Pacific Coast. Oregonian sports
journalist Harry Grayson likened the victory to that of President Harding a few months earlier,
claiming, “Ohio State University’s football eleven now knows just how Governor Cox felt for
the landslide to Mr. Harding in November.” In an attempt to detract any naysayers, Grayson
added that “Ohio did not have a Chinaman’s chance, and don’t let anyone tell you that the long
trip or the bright sunny afternoon had anything to with the result… they took today’s game
seriously and prepared carefully.” Grayson displayed particular glee in describing first team AllAmerican halfback Gaylord Stinchcomb’s inability to intercept a long pass thrown by first team
snub “Brick” Muller. The journalist’s portrayal had the Ohio State star standing “dumbfounded
as the oblong pigskin sailed over his head, whirling after the fashion of a highly charged
torpedo.” 23
Later that month, on January 23, fellow Oregonian journalist L.H. Gregory declared that
after California’s sound defeat of Ohio State, the “East Coast Appears To Be Dodging Western
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Football.” He claimed western schools attempted to answer eastern critics’ concerns of the
geographical fairness of intersectional games by agreeing to face eastern powers in their home
region. Gregory reported that all of the teams from the East constructed excuses and he
concluded that “it looks as if the east wants no more of Pacific coast football, whether at home or
abroad.”24
Contentious reporting was not exclusive to the West Coast. In January of 1920, the New
York Times proclaimed Harvard’s New Years Day victory over Oregon, as eastern football’s
“advantage over that of the Far West.” The writer determined that “At least four college teams of
the Atlantic section showed to better advantage than Harvard…Hence it was a case of the West’s
best bowing to an opponent that held no such high place in the East. For that reason the victory
was all the more gratifying to Eastern followers….”25 Whether they would admit it or not,
intersectional games proved just as important for regional pride in the eastern section of the
country.
Controversy aside, these intersectional games were extremely popular among a national
audience. The choice made by universities, coaches, and journalists to promote the contests,
demonstrated important personal decisions toward the national growth of collegiate football.
Robert Edgren, known for his nationally syndicated column “Sports through Edgren’s Eyes,”
viewed the popularity of the California-Ohio State Rose Bowl clash as an example of the
widespread interest in the game. 26 In agreement, famed coach John Heisman considered the
intersectional contests as “among the greatest boosters that football has” and believed the cross24
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country affairs tended to make the interest level surrounding college football “national instead of
sectional.”27 The coach’s assessment proved accurate, as intersectional games provided teams,
media, and fans unbiased evidence to prove regional supremacy. More importantly, the games
opened dialogue between formerly disparate regional football communities and served as a
unifying force in which media and fans from one section had direct relation with those from
another.
Sportswriters of the early 1920s caught on to the local and regional nature of college
football and the importance geography had upon their audiences. These intersectional games
were contests of regional pride for fans and the decisions made by sportswriters associated with
the collegiate sport to enhance the rivalries aided the substantial growth of the game during the
decade. For example, the Associated Press began keeping an intersectional scorecard in 1925,
and the ensuing headlines at the conclusion of the contests replaced school names with
geographical regions, such as “East Carries Grid Honors.”28 In the 1920s, the decision made by
sportswriters to act as proponents of this regional rivalry aided in providing western collegiate
football the coverage it had lacked, and consequently, their efforts supported the nationalization
of the sport.
More so than any other, the 1924 collegiate football season proved significant to the
national growth of the sport. In addition to colossal crowds and numerous “big games” during
the decade, the rise in popularity of the Notre Dame football team led by coach Knute Rockne
proved a significant factor in the revolutionary nature of the season.29 After many impressive
teams to begin the decade, the Irish’s1924 campaign proved its most dominant yet as they went
27
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undefeated and outscored their opponents 258 to 44.30 After completing a challenging schedule
that included East Coast powers Princeton and Army, Rockne’s squad was widely considered the
nation’s best team. In particular, the contest against Army proved important for the national
notoriety the team received. It was at the conclusion of Notre Dame’s thirteen to seven victory
that prominent New York Herald-Tribune sportswriter Grantland Rice, who at the time was
widely considered America’s preeminent sports journalist, penned a lead many deem the most
famous in sports history.31 In his trademark lyrical prose, Rice vividly described the Notre Dame
backfield in masterful fashion:
Outlined against a blue-gray October sky, the Four Horsemen rode again. In dramatic
lore they are known as Famine, Pestilence, Destruction and Death. These are only aliases.
Their real names are Stuhldreher, Miller, Crowley and Layden. They formed the crest of
the South Bend cyclone before which another fighting Army football team was swept
over the precipice at the Polo Grounds yesterday afternoon….32
By the following week, the Notre Dame backfield was the biggest story in sports, as the
metaphor fed the cravings of a nation desiring spectacle - the four horseman reincarnated met
this yearning. While the backfield possessed skill and the team proved talented, it was “the Four
Horsemen” nickname that led to the national notoriety the Irish yearned. While most
sportswriters provided subdued coverage or featured star Illinois halfback Red Grange’s fivetouchdown performance against Michigan, Rice chose a different story, and his decision to
feature Notre Dame enhanced the national recognition of the Irish.33
At the conclusion of the 1924 season, the now nationally acclaimed Notre Dame brand
advantageously affected West Coast football. In a matchup the New York Times claimed would
30
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determine “whether or not the Far West is stronger than the East,” the 1925 Rose Bowl game
pitted eastern power Notre Dame against West Coast champion Stanford University,34 The
colossal matchup saw Notre Dame defeat Stanford 27-10 in front of 52,000 spectators. In its
recap of the Irish victory, the New York Times continued its focus on the regional aspects of the
matchup and consistently referred to Notre Dame and Stanford interchangeably as “East” and
“West” respectively.35
Interestingly enough, the match that highlighted the end of the 1924 football season
almost did not occur. The Notre Dame administration had always shied away from playing West
Coast teams in postseason games because of the professionalization associated with the long
travel to the contests, but they looked past the issue in 1924 due to a substantial $35,000 payday
that provided vital funding for a dilapidated university gymnasium. Furthermore, it took an
increased payout to convince Stanford to play a school they believed possessed an inferior
“scholastic standard.”
Taking advantage of the long voyage to California, Rockne turned the excursion into a
western tour that started in Chicago, stopped in New Orleans, Houston, Tucson, and Los Angeles
en route to the game, and included pit stops in San Francisco and Denver on the trek home. The
stops involved “continuous rounds of luncheons, banquets, and receptions” attended by adoring
fans who treated the Irish as celebrities. Moreover, Notre Dame football appeared on the front
page of every city they visited and the local newspapers of these cities continued to consider the
Irish the pinnacle of their football coverage in subsequent seasons. As college sports historian
Murray Sperber notes, the attention provided the Irish “more coverage than any team outside of
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their own region.”36 Largely due to the success of their western tour, the Irish negotiated to play
an annual contest with the University of Southern California beginning in 1926. The matchup
proved to be one of the most highly anticipated intersectional matchups of every college football
season throughout the 1920s.37 The Notre Dame publicity tour that coincided with the Rose
Bowl provided enhanced association between formerly disengaged regional football
communities.
Stanford’s Pop Warner, Rockne’s adversary in the 1925 Rose Bowl game, was another
coach who brought increased respect to West Coast football. When the California institution
hired Warner in 1924 – a man previously deemed the “dean of Eastern football coaches” – the
revered football figure brought the high esteem he earned as a successful coach of the Carlisle
Indian School and Pittsburgh University to the West.38 In the East, football media, fans, and
coaches equated Pop Warner with success and respect, thus Warner’s decision to coach at
Stanford further enhanced eastern regard for the school’s football team and the situation of the
game on the West Coast. Warner was one of many collegiate coaches who made the move
westward during the decade – the cross country treks made by men who eastern football
supporters and media respected proved essential in garnering esteem for the West Coast football
community.39
Coaches such as Rockne and Warner served as significant figures in the mind of the
1920s football public. While athletes graduated and left the university after four years, fans
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became accustomed to the same coach roaming the sidelines season after season. Because of the
continuity of the head coach, fans more often associated the success of a team with the man
leading them rather than the athletes on the field. College football coaches sought and received
substantial rewards for their celebrity status and could earn as much as $15,000-$20,000
annually – a salary that exceeded that of many full professors and some university presidents.40
Furthermore, the coaches played a larger role than in prior decades. Previously, individuals
leading college football teams were alumni volunteers seen more as advisers than anything else,
but in the 1920s the coach faced a role similar to the CEOs American society came to revere
during the decade – they were expected to organize, lead, and produce advantageous results.
In the 1920s, no coach received greater celebrity status than Knute Rockne of Notre
Dame. In his thirteen seasons as the head coach of the Fighting Irish, the school’s football team
amassed 105 victories opposed to twelve defeats and five ties. Rockne’s squads claimed four
national championships, scored 2,847 points, and had only 667 scored against them.41 This
success led to immense fame for the Notre Dame coach, and provided him numerous
opportunities in corporate America as he transcended the role of football coach and became a
celebrated public figure. Though Rockne’s salary never exceeded $11,000, he possessed a
substantial personal income from public speaking engagements, written work for various
publications, and multiple sponsorship deals.42
In addition to bringing the Irish football team into the limelight, the success of Rockne’s
teams catapulted the University of Notre Dame out of obscurity as an institution of higher
learning. From 1918, Rockne’s first season as head coach, to 1927, the enrollment and funds of
40
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Notre Dame doubled. At some point every fall, the small, Catholic school in rural South Bend,
Indiana possessed space in nearly every sports section across the country, which led to frequent
mention of the Irish in the national discussion of college football. Each reference to the Notre
Dame football team provided free publicity to the university and thus increased interest from
prospective students.
Notre Dame students and fans understood the notoriety Rockne’s teams brought to the
institution and repaid him with near deity status. In the 1930 edition of Notre Dame’s Official
Football Review – a publication that attempted “to give homage to the fighting men of Notre
Dame” – the school’s football coach received incredible amounts of praise. A cartoon produced
for the publication included a portrait of a jovial Rockne, a heroic Notre Dame football player,
and a headless angelic victory statue. An adolescent onlooker comments, “Why not put Rock’s
head on the winged victory statue?” The artist emphasizes the message of his cartoon by
headlining the sketch with the bold proclamation: “ROCKNE MEANS VICTORY.”43 The
success Rockne brought to Notre Dame led to an unrelenting reverence from Notre Dame
supporters and the rest of the college football world. The manner in which Rockne utilized his
fame made him a significant factor for the nationalization of the college game.
Rockne understood the uphill battle fought by West Coast football fans, journalists, and
coaches. In 1912, after three of Notre Dame’s star players failed to receive recognition on Walter
Camp’s All-American team, a student writer for the Notre Dame Scholastic wrote a satirical
poem that mocked Camp’s selection process:
My plan is just pick Harvard first
And then pick good ole Yale.
43
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With five of crimson, six of blue,
It seems the only way,
To pick the best of East and West
For All-Amerikay
One of the three star players excluded from the team was none other than Knute Rockne.44
As a coach, Rockne’s 1919 Notre Dame team received national championship distinction
by some polls after a regular season with nine victories and no losses or ties. Unfortunately, in
most national polls, eastern sportswriters deemed the 9-0-1 Harvard Crimson the national
champions. The annoyance of sharing a title led Rockne to negotiate an East Coast matchup with
the Crimson the following season but Harvard replied, “it would seem to us inadvisable to play
Notre Dame next year.” 45 The disrespect from the northeastern football teams and media
provoked Rockne’s quest to wrestle the monopoly of respect away from the Northeast and thus
expand the landscape of college football.
After their prolific 1924 regular season, the prominence Notre Dame acquired could have
stayed dormant in South Bend, Indiana, but Rockne took his team’s newfound respect on a
western tour. During this excursion, the college football community focused on the West Coast.
Yes, Notre Dame may have dominated the headlines, but Stanford appeared alongside the Irish
as a formidable opponent. Furthermore, after the 1925 season, Rockne negotiated the annual
intersectional matchup with the University of Southern California. After the success of Notre
Dame’s western tour preceding the 1925 Rose Bowl, Rockne understood the potential notoriety
that would accompany a biannual West Coast excursion. Furthermore, Notre Dame’s presence in
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this region brought a respectable eastern product to the West Coast.46 The anticipation of this
annual matchup would place the University of Southern California in national sports headlines
and bring notoriety to a West Coast institution who sought the positive ramifications of eastern
respect. Notre Dame’s presence on the Pacific Coast fused East and West, which led to further
homogenization of college football. Rockne could have folded under the pressure of national
pundits and the concerns of the Notre Dame administration, but the coach understood the
significant national publicity and revenue that western contests offered his team.47 The decisions
by eastern and western institutions to meet in these matchups, Rockne’s strategically constructed
western tour and intersectional matchup with USC, and the choices made by national
sportswriters and editors to enhance their coverage of intersectional affairs aided in crafting a
more homogenous college football landscape in the 1920s.
Though 1924 produced significant factors toward eastern respectability of West Coast
football, Walter Camp’s 1924 All-American team revealed California center Edwin Horrell as
the only Far West player worthy of placement on the first team. The lack of players from the
Pacific Coast displayed that the region continued to evoke sentiments of inferiority from eastern
pundits. Though advocates of West Coast collegiate football still felt slighted, the 1924 college
football season laid important foundations toward the nationalization of the game.48
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The Far West’s seemingly desperate craving for respect may seem like excessive
whining, but in the 1920s, omission from the countrywide college football conversation excluded
a university and its supporters from a national phenomenon. The game’s popularity during the
decade expanded in large part due to a national emphasis on physical exercise following World
War I. The amount of men deemed unfit when the United States entered the conflict proved
concerning for the nation’s leadership, and American General Leonard Wood proclaimed that of
all the men drafted for service, half had been out of shape. This “preparedness crisis” provoked
an effort to groom young American men for service through activities of “discipline, courage,
teamwork, endurance, and other qualities necessary to soldiers.” Football included all of these
pertinent aspects and was taught and played by soldiers at military camps throughout the United
States. By the end of World War I, the relationship between the game and the military proved so
influential that the New York Times determined “football owed more to the war in the way of the
spread of the spirit of the game then it does to ten or twenty years of development.”49
The fact that numerous young men matured academically and socially at American
universities made the college game a particularly attractive training tool for the nation. A 1922
issue of the Oregonian proclaimed that in particular “the pre-eminence of football as a college
game is due to the essential manliness of the sport, the physical prowess that it implies, and to
the team work which it requires….” The newspaper echoed what many across the country
believed, that the game spread beyond solely training for the army, but it also served as “a
primary requisite in training for citizenship in a democracy.”50
If one were to question the American craze toward football in the 1920s, impressive
attendance figures erased any doubts. College football attendance increased 119% during the
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decade and exceeded 10 million spectators by 1930.51 Furthermore, the 1927 intersectional clash
between Southern California and Notre Dame, in which an estimated 123,000 patrons filled
Chicago’s Soldier Field, highlighted a decade in which large crowds at major college football
bouts became standard.52 Robert Edgren boldly determined that the increased attendance at these
contests proved that “football seemed likely to displace baseball as the recognized ‘national
sport’.”53
Following World War I, economic prosperity provided Americans the opportunity to
attend these football contests. The real wages of industrial workers in the United States increased
by twenty-five-percent, the most the working-class had ever enjoyed up until the decade.54
Moreover, wealthier Americans earned their wages working fewer hours. In the 1920s,
mechanization of post-war society led to the reduction of the average workweek from sixty hours
to an average of forty-eight hours.55 American citizens lived in a prosperous nation and could
have spent their money on numerous activities, but it was their individual decisions to expend
their newfound wealth and free time at college football contests.
Why did Americans choose to spend their money and idle time watching amateur
athletics? Simply put, college football was a spectacle. During a game spectators witnessed
average males step into primitive, yet regulated, combat. Extravagant parades, supplemented by
the pageantry of bands, mascots, and cheerleaders, were present at nearly every contest. Football
came to be associated with a festive spirit and with every game the pride of the school’s alumni
51
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was at stake. As famed sports journalist Grantland Rice sarcastically noted in a 1924 column:
“We met an old grad who didn’t care whether you roasted or boosted his college football
team…or whether you even mentioned it. It was the first funeral we had attended in years.”56
Furthermore, one could claim a school’s colors regardless of whether they had attended the
institution. A citizen of Southern California took regional pride in the victory of the Trojans, just
as a resident of Pittsburgh relished the triumph of every Panther eleven. The jovial atmosphere of
collegiate football contests, complemented by the intimate relationship possessed by citizens
with their local teams, led to western football supporters demanding their inclusion into the
national conversation of the sport; they wanted to be central to its existence. 57
On game day, the parade-like atmosphere that engulfed university campuses became a
sense of pride for West Coast football supporters, as they believed the western atmosphere
superior to any other region of the country. When writing of Walter Camp’s impending visit to
view the California-Stanford football match in November of 1924, Phile Rolfe of the Berkeley
Daily Gazette claimed: “It is a generally accepted fact that eastern football games do not
compare with those from the west in organized cheering, rooting stunts and intensity of spirit
among the spectators.” The author failed to mention the West’s superior athletes or style of play,
rather he believed atmosphere a central component to the superiority of western collegiate
football. Rolfe deemed the environment of this particular rivalry game as one that should show
the superiority of the western game day experience more so than any other and would leave “Mr.
Camp’s opinion of Pacific Coast football” as one that would bring the California Alumni pride.58
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According to Rolfe, Camp’s visit, his first trip to the Far West in thirty years, would
prove that West Coast football was superior to the East not due to action on the field, but rather
to the exploits of pep squads and the supporters in the stands. The environment surrounding these
affairs proved intimate and crucial components to the contest, just as important as the athletes
and coaches. Supporters’ participation aided their team’s effort for victory and, on this particular
day, helped bring respect to West Coast football. Thus for some proponents of the game in the
West, the carnival-like atmosphere provoked by 1920s football contests served as an instrument
to garner respect from the eastern media.
When Camp settled in his seat to witness the 1924 West Coast matchup, he was one of
the over 76,000 spectators who filled University of California’s Memorial Stadium to watch the
home team battle Stanford to a 20-20 tie. 59 The substantial attendance and interest surrounding
the game resembled many collegiate football contests during the decade. Moreover, the large
crowds and ticket prices attendees were willing to pay for admittance provoked the construction
of larger stadiums. During the 1920s, universities across the country met the demand with the
production of fifty-five concrete and brick structures, six of which possessed capacities of greater
than 70,000.60
A necessity for more seats due to increased attendance was obvious, but this was not the
only factor that provoked the construction of new stadiums. The ambition of fan bases and
coaches proved equally influential, as the 1920s witnessed a facilities arms race in which
universities attempted to out-construct rival institutions. To be at the vanguard of stadium
assembly would ensure that the atmosphere surrounding college football games was up to par
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with the opposition and create the illusion of a prominent program regardless of the product on
the field.
Always one to attempt to be at the forefront of college football, Knute Rockne first
pressured the Notre Dame administration to construct a new stadium in 1923. A larger stadium
would entice “big-time” opponents to play Notre Dame at home – a sign of respect from
previously noncomplying East Coast teams.61 In 1927, after seasons of persistence from Rockne,
Notre Dame finally agreed to provide its football team with a new home field. The Notre Dame
coach single-handedly planned and oversaw the erection of Notre Dame Stadium, which led to a
Notre Dame’s supporter’s proclamation that the stadium contained “a lot more ‘Rock’…than
even the builders dreamed.”62
In addition to the spectator, the convenience and opinion of the sports writer weighed
heavily on the stadium’s design. After an investigation of the new Notre Dame Stadium press
box, Chicago Herald-Examiner Sports Editor Warren Brown deemed it “perhaps the crowning
glory of the stadium.” The journalist then sarcastically noted that those constructing the stadium
determined a new press box necessary, and “since there was no use in having a press box without
a stadium, the stadium was built.” 63 The apparent philosophy taken by athletic directors was that
comfort and respect provided to sports journalists would result in more favorable coverage.
Those attempting to improve the significance of their team or region among the national football
community understood the significance of having the press in your corner. If one could fall into
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favor with an influential sportswriter, the subsequent national coverage could result in
considerable popularity and respect from the entire nation. Knute Rockne appreciated the power
of the media – especially the New York press, which contained the nation’s most influential
sportswriters and publications. Prior to the 1924 season, Rockne noted in correspondence with an
associate: “New York is the heart of the matter. That’s the big time. When they start noticing us
there, everybody else will fall in line.”64
The close relationships developed by coaches and sports journalists proved valuable for
both parties. Frequently, sportswriters and coaches shared drinks after the game or traveled
together on road trips.65 In 1925, Alabama coach Camp Pickens sent a telegram to Grantland
Rice in which he invited the prominent sports reporter to travel with the team on its trip to
Pasadena for the Rose Bowl.66 Moreover, the relationship between coaches and sportswriters
went beyond socializing to actual monetary gain and employment In the mid-1920s, before the
practice became discouraged and banned by certain conferences, coaches personally assigned
sports journalists to referee their games. The inside information and pay that came with this onthe-field access proved valuable for the reporters and they would often write coaches attempting
to officiate the season’s mostly highly anticipated games. In 1921, Harry Costello of the Detroit
News attempted to persuade Rockne to select him as the referee for the upcoming Notre DameArmy contest. Costello informed the Notre Dame coach that since Walter Camp would not be in
attendance at the Irish’s game, the sports reporter could return the favor by putting in a good
word for Notre Dame when he met with the selector of the All-American team a few days
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prior.67 Today, many may consider these personal relationships as impeding upon the necessary
objectivity of a journalist, but in the 1920s, these close associations allowed the journalist to
provide their audience the intimate relationships they craved and supplied coaches the publicity
they coveted.
During the 1920s, the increase in newspaper space devoted to athletics propelled sports
journalists into this novel and influential role. As opposed to previous decades, in which less
than one-percent of coverage was dedicated to sports, the Roaring Twenties saw an average daily
newspaper devote at least fifteen-percent of its stories to the subject. Moreover, a 1929 survey in
New York City found that one in every four readers bought a newspaper exclusively for the
sports section.68 In the environment of the decade, newspapers attempted to please the most and
offend the least. This led to an attempt to drift away from the hard news stories American readers
loathed after continually reading of despair during World War I. 69 In sports, the emphasis on
victory and the association with sensational storylines accomplished this goal. In particular,
college football provided a spectacle few other sports could duplicate. Collegiate teams
represented and symbolized not only local communities and universities, but also entire regions.
In a time before television, college football was local in nature with supporters most often
cheering for the hometown and state university. This intimacy associated with the sport increased
the passion accompanying the games. The increased influence and audience provided to sport
sections allowed sports writers to promote opinions to a national audience.70
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On the morning of March 15, 1925, college football fans opened their morning papers to
the shocking news that Walter Camp passed away in his New York City hotel room the day
prior. After admiration and mourning of the football legend subsided, concerned fans brought
forth an anxious inquiry: Who was to pick Camp’s prominent All-American team for the
upcoming season? Collier’s magazine decided to place the responsibility upon Grantland Rice. 71
The publication deemed Rice “the best-informed sports authority in America” and the quality of
his writing, unrivaled reputation and contacts in the football community made the sports
journalist an easy choice.72 Collier’s decision to name Rice as Camp’s successor determined that
the prominence associated with the team would persist. Furthermore, placing Rice in this
prominent position illustrated the ascension of the sportswriter as a central figure in college
football.
While Collier’s displayed confidence in its selection of Rice, Camp’s replacement proved
hesitant. Rice claimed that when approached to select the All-American team for the 1925
season, “I squawked loudly. I didn’t want any part of the job.” The journalist’s reservation was
due to his belief “that it’s completely impossible for one man to name the eleven best players in
the country – after scouting a handful of games through one pair of eyes.”73 Moreover, he
witnessed the backlash Camp received, and continued to face, due to his perceived snub of
particular regions in the annual selections. In fact, in 1926, the president of the University of
Georgia faced extreme difficultly when trying to raise money from southern schools in an effort
to build a memorial honoring the deceased coach. The college and universities deemed it
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unnecessary to raise funds for an individual they believed proved indifferent and ignorant toward
southern football and named far too few southern players to the All-American team.74
In early November of 1925, Rice placed his reluctance aside and set out to select his first
team. While Camp usually named his All-American team with the aid of “an informal group of
friends,” Rice recognized the necessity of a more refined selection process to meet the demands
of college football’s national growth.75 Aware of his inability to view all the worthy athletes in
the country, the sportswriter sent numerous confidential telegrams to coaches, sportswriters, and
referees inquiring if they had witnessed any collegiate football players worthy of selection to his
squad. 76 Rice continued this request for commendable All-Americans the following season and
acknowledged that he received “no less than eighty-five telegraph messages” prior to carefully
selecting his team. During the 1926 season, in addition to sending telegraphs, Rice employed ten
of the nation’s most respected collegiate coaches, four of which were from the West Coast, to aid
him with the selection process. However, the final decision still rested with Rice.77 In 1926, the
New York Herald-Tribune reporter’s efforts were evident when, for the first time since its
inception, the Walter Camp All-American first team included more players from “the other side
of the Alleghenies” than from the East.78
In an increased effort to depict a truly national representation on the team, Rice added the
All-America Advisory Board to the selection process in 1929. The “Collier’s board” would
“cover every football section of the country and…standardize the selection in a better way than
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ever it has been done before.” In an effort to cover a “nation-wide canvass,” the group consisted
of six reputable sports writers from the Pacific Coast, Missouri Valley, Southwest, Mid-West,
East, and South.79 While Walter Camp chose a team that he would hypothetically take to the
field to challenge opponents, Rice focused more upon recognition of an athlete’s exceptional
play during the season.80
While Rice always indicated the qualities necessary to be chosen as an All-American, he
took a quantitative approach in the selection of the 1929 squad. The All-America Advisory
Board graded the nominees on six determinants: schedule difficulties, ball carrying, passing,
blocking, tackling, and kicking. Each athlete was given a numerical score out of one-hundred,
and in table format, the categorical averages of each player chosen on the first team stood
alongside their name. Despite the advisory board’s obvious influence, Collier’s made sure to
inform the reader that even though the facts and opinions were gathered by the advisory board;
the team was still very much under the control of Grantland Rice. 81 The effort taken by Rice and
Collier’s to modify the decision process, and thus hopefully yield a more balanced and fair AllAmerican team, displayed the importance the selections had to the collegiate sport and its
supporters.82
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Furthermore, the systematic process utilized by Rice fit well with the scientific efficiency
employed by many 1920s American businesses. In accordance with the philosophy of Frederick
Taylor, many of the nation’s corporate institutions focused on the most efficient manner of
production in order to produce the best possible profit. Furthermore, during the decade, the focus
on efficiency began to encompass multiple aspects of American life. In order to justify choices
that were certain to be controversial in the eyes of the American public, the sportswriter depicted
his process as objective and systematic. By making the process transparent and reflective of
modern society, the 1929 All-American team introduced a system that not only quelled
controversy but also proved more efficient and representative of a national football landscape.83
The telegrams and letters received by Rice from sportswriters, coaches, and fans prior to
the selection of his first All-American team exhibited the fact that the geographical fairness of
coverage was still a concern of many in 1925. In general, the letters received from the East Coast
displayed less length, detail, and passion compared to those received from the Mid West and
West Coast. A letter from a Mr. S. Best complimented Collier’s for naming Rice as a
replacement to Camp, but then continued to explain that the Missouri Valley believed the
Nebraska football team “never received the attention or credit to which they are entitled.” Best
felt it was the university’s “geographical location that has robbed her great football teams of
much deserved recognition.”84
In October of 1925, San Francisco Call sportswriter Edgar “Scoop” Fleeson sent a
similar letter to Rice. In comparable fashion to Best, Fleeson first praised Collier’s for selecting
Rice as Camp’s successor, and then insisted that Rice consider the quality players of the Pacific
Coast for the 1925 team. Fleeson spoke glowingly of the game’s growth in the West and
83

Lynn Dumenil, The Modern Temper: American Culture and Society in the 1920s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995),
60.
84
“I’m not in the habit of…”: S. Best to GR, Nov. 16, 1925: VUL, Grantland Rice Papers, Box 1.

36

provided attendance figures of West Coast games to prove his assertion. The San Francisco
sports writer was particularly fond of Stanford’s 1925 captain: Ernie Nevers.85 He not only
praised Nevers in the lengthy letter, but also sent a seven-page telegram to Rice the next month
commending the halfback for a dominant performance in his final collegiate game versus the
University of California.86 Agreeing with Fleeson’s assessment, Stanford coach Pop Warner sent
two telegrams to Rice in November of 1925 applauding his star player. Warner even proclaimed
Nevers to be, “without question the best fullback I have ever seen.”87 Fleeson’s and Warner’s
insistence paid off and the Stanford captain was included on Rice’s 1925 team.88
The efforts of Best, Fleeson, Warner, and other concerned football supporters displayed
their concern over the northeastern bias surrounding college football, and the subsequent action
taken by Rice displayed the influence of these letters and telegrams. Moreover, these forms of
communication showed that All-America selections still proved valuable in the quest to end the
disrespect of West Coast football and other regional football communities. With this favoritism
removed, other sections of the country gained the opportunity to receive publicity that could
advance the respect of their local football communities and thus accelerate the game’s national
expansion.
The 1920s saw a significant shift of regional notoriety in college football. In prior
decades, the northeastern portion of the United States monopolized the respect of the collegiate
game and pundits in the early twenties displayed reluctance in offering West Coast football with
the esteem its teams, sports journalists, fans, and coaches craved. Victorious results in
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intersectional matches, more western athletes on All-American teams, and the promotion of West
Coast squads by local supporters and journalists proved hard to ignore, and by decade’s end
Northeast football representatives began to take notice. In his review of the 1927 collegiate
season, Colombia Head Coach Charles Crowley admitted that their seemed to be a balance
between all sections of the country.89 Moreover, in the 1928 season, the USC Trojans earned
distinction as national champions.90 This honor proved valuable to Southern California, but it
also served as a victory for the entire West Coast. When reviewing the same season, Grantland
Rice admitted to the dominance of the West and viewed its superiority as a potentially
reoccurring trend.91 The struggle for respect appeared to have nearly subsided, as the West began
receiving recognition as a respectable component of the national college football landscape.
While many sports historians have attributed social, cultural, and economic changes in
the United States to the national growth of college football in the 1920s, just as important to the
homogenization of the game were the efforts of individuals such as Rice, Rockne, and Warner
who took advantage of these social changes. Had Rice spurned the requests of coaches,
sportswriters, and football supporters in the West, the Northeast bias of the sport would have
likely persisted. The construction of larger stadiums, the reports of worthy western athletes, and
successful Pacific teams certainly influenced Rice’s decision to expand the geographical
landscape of the All-American team, but it was still a personal decision that ultimately allowed
this imperative change to occur. To generalize the nationalization of college football as the result
of an American environment conducive to change, wrestles away agency from the influential
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actions of many concerned, persistent, and determined individuals. The same holds true for all
revolutionary aspects of this culturally transformative decade. The environment of the 1920s
situated the decade as progressive, but the efforts of individual Americans allowed the alterations
to occur. To ignore this characteristic of the decade would be an egregious error.
Furthermore, supporters of local football communities refused to stand by idly. Western
proponents of the sport believed that through intersectional contests and the Walter Camp AllAmerican football team, college football teams in the West could garner the notoriety they
deserved and thus illuminate the West Coast football community as equal, or even superior, to
the sport in the East. The efforts of college football fans and journalists to advocate for the
inclusion of their teams as reputable members of the sport’s national conversation demonstrates
the importance of regional football communities during the 1920s. Every ounce of respect
received from the national college football community yielded a sense of superiority – a
consciousness that proved essential, as the stability of local autonomy seemed to be decaying in
all aspects of American life. College football served as Americans’ last resort – one last chance
to promote unique characteristics that appeared to be quickly fading as the United States
modernized at an increasingly rapid pace.
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Chapter Two
The SMU Mustangs and the Rise of Southwest Football
After two dismal seasons as the inaugural coach of the Southern Methodist University
football team, Ray Morrison received notice from the school’s president, Robert Stewart Hyer,
that “pressures from downtown make it necessary for me to ask for your resignation.”1 While
two first-year victories provided some promise, a winless 1916 season, which included a 143-4
loss to the Rice Institute from Houston, evaporated any sense of optimism from the local Dallas,
Texas community. 2 Still celebrated for his All-American playing career at Vanderbilt, the
young coach appeared the suitable choice to bring football prestige to SMU, Dallas, and the state
of Texas, but the regional and local communities’ strong desire for prominence would not
tolerate subpar performances.
Opening in 1915, SMU was supposed to fill the void in southern, Methodist education
after Vanderbilt severed its relations with the church a decade prior.3 The university intended to
serve as a beacon of pride for the Dallas community and all southern Methodists, and as the most
visible component of the university, a positive image of the football program proved vital for the
school’s success. The university’s newspaper, The Campus, ashamedly noted after Morrison’s
second year that “Frankly, the season was not a howling success,” but mentioned, “Next season,
with eight or ten veterans back, there should be a different tale.”4 Those outside of the
university’s campus failed to view the future with the same confidence – many concerned
supporters believed an underwhelming team revealed an inferior school.
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In October of 1916, the Bursar of SMU, Frank Reedy, received correspondence from a
displeased Texas Methodist pastor. The religious man declared himself not to be a “college
athletic crank,” yet he despised “to hear of the team I am naturally interested in getting so
dreadfully defeated. GET IN THE GAME OR GET OUT.” Moreover, the pastor confessed that
to read of the SMU defeats in the newspaper proved “humiliating to an ambitious Methodist….”5
As the outside pressure mounted, Reedy grew discouraged. The Bursar confided to a friend the
same month that “this football situation, as immaterial loss or victory really is, is hurting our
prestige in Dallas immensely. I am getting tired of having Dallas men throw jives at us…before
we get money we must have enthusiasm and prestige and we have to get it.”6 In order to acquire
the desired reputation, it became apparent to Reedy that a coaching change must occur.
Reedy’s fears demonstrate the bilateral relationship between the Dallas community and
the SMU football team, and the similar link between the football team and the university, during
this period. A successful football team required public support to function financially and a
juvenile university needed a prosperous football team for the legitimacy and monetary support
that arrived with success. After such a tumultuous two-year relationship, it proved difficult to
believe that Morrison and Southern Methodist University would ever rekindle their partnership,
but Morrison not only returned four years later to lead the SMU freshman team, he resumed
coaching the varsity squad by the 1922 season. By the end of the decade, the previously fired
coach had entered SMU, Texas, and Southwestern lore for transforming perennial losers into a
championship caliber team. And more importantly, he converted the Southwest into one of the
most respected gridiron regions in the country. In the 1920s, the success of the Southern
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Methodist University football team directly influenced the growth and notoriety of collegiate
football in the Southwest region of the United States. Moreover, the style of play employed by
SMU provided the region with a football identity that proved necessary for its acceptance into
the national football community.
At the beginning of the 1920s, the notoriety and respect of Southwestern football shared
the same dismal outlook as Ray Morrison’s coaching career. Many national collegiate football
supporters believed that the game in the Southwest was inferior to other parts of the nation, and
future prospects for the region did not look promising. Famed college football coach John
Heisman believed that because of scorching temperatures “You’ll never have great football
played by the Southwestern teams; the climate won’t permit it.”7 Furthermore, All-American
selections and national championship contenders lacked any mention of Southwestern athletes or
schools, regardless of their performance or record.
The future of Southern Methodist football appeared bleak as well. Morrison’s departure
failed to generate improvement for the program, and he quietly returned to Southern Methodist
as the coach of the freshman football team in 1920.8 However, despite five seasons of poor
results, SMU supporters displayed optimism ahead of the 1921 campaign. At the start of the
season, SMU captain Jimmie Kitts professed, “this looks like our year,” and he admitted to the
team “pointing our campaign on the Texas Aggie game….”9
The contest against the intrastate Aggies had quickly turned into a rivalry game for the
young university. The previous season, the Aggies claimed a narrow victory over the Southern
Methodist Mustangs, but many SMU supporters believed the 1921 Texas A&M team to be less
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formidable and the Dallas squad to be much improved. Contributing to the excitement
surrounding the game, the contest coincided with the State Fair of Texas – an affair that would
display Dallas “to the public of Texas, the Southwest, and the world.” A positive performance
proved vital to the city’s residents while under such a grand spotlight.10
After a win over Howard Payne University to open the 1921 season, the anticipation for
the Texas A&M game reached a feverous pitch both on the SMU campus and throughout the
city. The university cancelled classes and deemed the day of the game as “Dallas Day.”
Furthermore, approximately four hundred students attended yell practices and pep meetings for
two weeks leading up to the event. The local community displayed confidence in a Southern
Methodist triumph, and the students prepared for a victory that “would place SMU at the head of
southwestern football circles.”11 Unfortunately, the optimism proved all for naught as Texas
A&M trounced the Mustangs thirteen to zero. Not only did the Aggies win, they humiliated
SMU by holding them scoreless in front of eight thousand spectators – a large crowd by 1921
Southwest Conference (SWC) football standards.12
Two days after the SMU varsity squad’s humbling performance, Ray Morrison led his
freshman team to a sound defeat of Rusk College by the score of seventy-eight to zero. Unlike
the varsity, Morrison’s players generated the excitement and success that Southern Methodist
supporters craved since the football program’s inception.13 Tired of yet another campaign in
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which “the Mustang rooting section” proved “the feature of the entire season,” the university
once again hired Ray Morrison as the head coach of the Southern Methodist varsity team prior to
the 1922 season.14
The substantial margins of victory and exhilarating passing offense utilized by
Morrison’s teams transformed the coach into a catalyst for excitement, and nearly immediately,
Morrison rejuvenated the Southern Methodist football program. In the third game of the 1922
season, Morrison’s Mustangs trounced the Tigers of Louisiana State University – the only team
to defeat the Texas A&M Aggies in 1921 – by the score of fifty-one to zero. The high-profile
victory over the Tigers provided SMU supporters with the signature win they had demanded for
the past six seasons. Following the game, Dallas Morning News sportswriter William Ruggles
prophesized that the Mustang triumph would “cause coaches around the loop to sit up and take
notice of the team out on the hill.”15 The Fort Worth Star-Telegram supplemented the hype by
proclaiming that the victory situated the SMU team “as dangerous contenders for the
Southwestern grid title….”16
Finally, the Dallas community possessed some sense of accomplishment regarding their
hometown football program. By no means would one consider the Tigers a national power, but
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LSU was a respected regional opponent that many college football experts expected to defeat the
Mustangs. Furthermore, after its first three games, SMU scored one hundred and four more
points than it had in the previous season.17 The dominant manner of these victories became
infectious. The respect, notoriety, and success provided by the team revitalized the “college
spirit,”18 and the student newspaper depicted the student body’s high expectations when it
published a cartoon of a Mustang player dreaming of a 1922 Southwest Conference
Championship.19
Prior to 1922, rational supporters of SMU never considered that a conference
championship was possible, but the early-season success had many believing this to be a
legitimate prospect. Anticipation swelled as the team continued to win its subsequent games, and
ahead of a highly anticipated bout with a powerful Baylor team, Miss Mildred Harris, the exwife of Charlie Chaplin, insisted on observing a SMU practice while in town. “Ever since my
arrival in Dallas, I have heard nothing but the coming Thanksgiving game and S.M.U.’s chance
to win,” declared Harris. “I am agreeably surprised to see such an excellent brand of football
turned out in the South. The S.M.U. men seem determined to win…and I am counting on the
Mustangs to more than match the Bears added weight with their fight and grit.”20 Unfortunately,
for both SMU and Miss Harris, Southern Methodist proved unsuccessful in matching Baylor’s
talent and size, as Morrison’s men lost 24-0. Though the Thanksgiving loss to the Bears
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disappointed many, the Mustang season introduced an unprecedented, winning brand of football
that rejuvenated the Southern Methodist and Dallas communities.21
Regrettably, controversy quickly interrupted the city’s celebration. At the beginning of
the decade, President Hiram Boaz responded to pressure from Dallas businessmen and
announced that he planned to emphasize a winning football program at SMU. The scheme
provided initial success, as Morrison recruited ten highly skilled athletes – the “immortal ten” –
prior to the 1921 season. By 1922, these heralded recruits brought vastly improved skill to the
Mustang varsity squad and their contribution to the transformation of the Southern Methodist
football program was unquestionable. However, the athletic emphasis yielded embarrassment
when officials from the Southwest Conference, the athletic affiliation of the largest Texas,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas colleges and universities, were informed that SMU football players
received monetary compensation for jobs not performed, were provided loans that did not require
repayment, and were allowed participation on the football team despite poor academic standing.
Following this discovery, the Southwest Conference investigation committee recommended
suspension, which the Mustangs avoided only after a vote among the member institutions fell
short by a single tally.22
SMU’s association with the Southwest Conference was salvaged but controversy
persisted. The SWC recommended that Southern Methodist conduct its own internal faculty
investigation, and the SMU board of trustees complied by forming a group of five faculty
members to prepare a report and “clear the university of the odium attached to them.”
21
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Unfortunately for the board of trustees, the opposite occurred as the faculty report justified
nearly all the violations charged to the university. The five faculty members further condemned
the football program by suspending two players and indefinitely suspending another until he
supplied a proper transcript. Furthermore, the committee recommended Southern Methodist not
renew the contract of business manager of athletics Doc Blackwell, who had assisted Morrison in
the recruitment of the “immortal ten.” Though Blackwell remained in his position, SMU faculty
members accepted the report forty-four votes to twenty-one.23
The report’s conclusions generated a turbulent relationship between the faculty and the
city’s businessmen, even prompting a Dallas jeweler and trustee, H.R. Shuttles, to boldly
declare, “that SMU should be run and officered by businessmen while faculty of the university
believe that the affairs of the school should be handled by churchmen and the faculty.” Shuttles
would eventually resign in fury.24 An incensed Judge Cockrell, chair of the board of trustees,
wrote and published an eighty-four-page booklet he entitled “A Review of the Athletic Situation
and of the Case of Huff and Smith.” In his attempt to counter the faculty report, Cockrell
addressed the book to the “Friends and Enemies of Southern Methodist University, within and
without” and distributed 2500 copies to the student body and 500 additional copies for public
consumption.25 The efforts of the board of trustees proved the most telling aspect of the
controversy.
The extreme nature of these refutes displayed the value Dallas businessmen placed on
reputation. When the media relayed news of SMU’s immoral actions to the public, the negativity
associated with the crisis created a distasteful perception of the Dallas community. A negative
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civic and regional reputation served as a blemish on the character of those who identified
themselves as residents of the city. In1920s American society, the national reputation of
community mattered more than ever. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of the late
nineteenth century eradicated the autonomous, local communities that peppered the American
landscape throughout much of the country’s existence – by the 1920s, Americans inhabited a
more connected nation characterized by a widespread association of corporations that served to
homogenize the country. In this increasingly impersonal society, citizens of Dallas identified
less with their neighborhoods and jobs and more with their city and region – an evolution that
proved particularly true for businessmen whose affairs were now conducted on a national level.
When Southern Methodist, Dallas’s institution of higher learning, acted immorally, the potential
conclusions associates from other regions of the country may draw invoked fear amongst the
civic community. Businessmen believed a reputable and successful SMU football team improved
their personal image. Thus, they felt that the defense of their extended identities must be
defended to no end. Fortunately, for the businessman, the controversy surrounding the Mustangs
was short-lived, and by the following season focus returned to Morrison’s success with the
football program.26
On Thanksgiving Day of 1923, the Southern Methodist Mustangs again faced the Baylor
Bears with the exciting prospect of the school’s first Southwest Conference title on the line. The
Mustangs progressed through the season unscathed and excitement reached unprecedented levels
ahead of the game. In what had become a recurring challenge, the Mustangs once again found
themselves on the wrong end of a substantial size advantage. The SMU student newspaper
turned the shortcoming into a rallying cry by proclaiming: “The Bigger They Are the Harder
26
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They Fall!” In the November 21 issue, the paper posted the customary slogan following a list of
the Baylor and Southern Methodist player weights, and a snippet of the biblical David and
Goliath story supplemented the article. The message was clear: “There’s nobody on our team
who is afraid, – there’s nobody on our team who does not feel that what he CAN do will be
enough to stop Baylor, enough to out-guess, out-game, out play them.”27 In addition to
displaying the students’ relentless belief and support for their team, The Demi-Weekly Campus
continuously designated the athletes as “our.” A few years prior, many students desired minimal
association with the team, but in 1923, the Mustangs were an appreciated component of Southern
Methodist University, a symbol of pride for the community. Moreover, the buildup even reached
criminal proportions when Baylor students allegedly kidnapped two SMU students a couple of
days ahead of the matchup. After the perpetrators branded “B.U.” on the victim’s face, the
Southern Methodist supporters were disgracefully released back to their peers.28
Fervent support by the citizens of Dallas accompanied the passionate student body. In the
“Beat Baylor” section of The Dallas Dispatch, sportswriter George White described the city’s
zealous attitude toward the approaching game. White cheerfully professed that “so great has
become the enthusiasm of Dallas over the fine prospect of our local Methodist University
winning the Southwest Conference championship….The big battle…is the chief topic of
conversation all over town, even in homes where sports do not usually receive much attention.”
White continued by lauding the local university, stating: “‘Beat Baylor’ buttons appear and civic
pride, deeply stirred, has made possible this “Beat Baylor” edition as a tribute to what S.M.U.
has done to put Dallas on the football map.”29
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The Mustangs made sure their supporters’ enthusiasm did not go unrewarded as they
dominated Baylor sixteen to zero in front of 19,000 spectators at Dallas’s Fair Park Stadium.
Baylor never came within forty-nine yards of the SMU goal line, and the Mustang offense
accumulated five hundred yards of offense to Baylor’s sixty-five.30 The game capped an
impressive, undefeated season that witnessed SMU score two hundred and seven points, while
allowing only nine to the opposition. Furthermore, they earned the school’s first Southwest
Conference Championship and seven Mustang players earned All-Conference honors.31
The successful season predicated a “great future” according to Hugh M. Frye, an auditor
in the SMU business office. Frye declared that “Dallas will have a population of half a million in
fifteen years and S.M.U. will expand in proportion until it becomes the leading University of the
Southwest.” Frye believed winning the Southwest Conference title “marked the beginning of a
school spirit which when developed would be an irresistible force in building up the
institution.”32 The Semi-Weekly Campus determined the relationship between the city and the
university firm, as it declared that after the successful and enthusiastic 1923 season, “Dallas has
fully recognized that S.M.U. is its university.”33
The Dallas community displayed their appreciation by personally inviting the Mustangs
to a banquet at Dallas’ Palm Garden Adolphus Hotel to celebrate the 1923 Southwest Conference
Title. The invitation declared the occasion to be: “Tendered By The Citizens of Dallas To The
Southern Methodist University Football Team and Coaches,” and included “A Toast to the
Mustangs”:

30

“S.M.U. Outclasses Bears 16-0 Here” The Semi-Weekly Campus, Vol. IX, No. 19, Dec. 5, 1923: SMUL.
Allison Danzig, The History of American Football: Its Great Teams, Players, and Coaches (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), 26.
For seven selected for All-Conference, see: Kern Tips, Football – Texas Style, 35.
32
“Great Future Is Seen for S.M.U.” The Semi-Weekly Campus, Vol. IX, No. 20, Dec. 8, 1923: SMUL.
33
“Victory” The Semi-Weekly Campus, Vol. IX, No. 19, Dec. 5, 1923: SMUL.
31

50

The Razorbacks fought gallantly;
The Aggies did their best;
The Frogs and Bears strove mightily,
But failed to meet the test.
So, here’s to those who conquered,
Bringing S.M.U. great fame;
Here’s to the mighty Mustangs –
Champs! All honor to their name!34
In the 1920s, the amicable relationship between the Mustangs and the Dallas business
community proved a vital component for the success of the football program. The financial
backing of Dallas businessmen, whether legal or illegal, served as essential support for a
successful gridiron future. Likewise, the city of Dallas experienced substantial change triggered
by the influence of the city’s businessmen. Strategically situated at a crossing of the Trinity
River, Dallas began as a modest frontier settlement in the 1840s. The city rapidly developed
following the construction of two railroads – the Houston & Texas Central and the Texas &
Pacific – in the 1870s. The presence of the railroads allowed the community to serve as an
important industrial marketplace for the entire Southwest, and the city received direct
compensation for its enhanced importance as Dallas’s population increased from approximately
3,000 to 10,358 in the 1870s. The next three decades witnessed steady growth until the city’s
population jumped from 92,104 to 158,976 in the 1910s.
By 1920, Dallas had become a metropolis and an important element of the American
economy, but it had yet to produce a single, dominant interest group to initiate civic
improvement or establish public institutions. In the subsequent decade, the community’s
businessmen ascended to this role and situated themselves as the sole influence of civic growth.
Under the guidance of new figureheads, the city’s population swelled from 158,976 to 260,475
in the 1920s and continued prosperity appeared inevitable. The new leaders began to “manage”
34
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all aspects of community action, including Southern Methodist University and its football
program.35
The civic growth experienced by Dallas was a national phenomenon. The 1920 census
marked the first time that at least half of the American population inhabited cities. The process of
urbanization had been continual since the late nineteenth century, and it ushered the American
populace from rural localities into industrialized metropolises. Furthermore, the organized and
nationalized nature of these urban societies led to the depletion of personal autonomy that
individuals enjoyed in a more intimate agrarian setting.36 Americans’ personal identities came to
be defined more by their city than unique individual traits, and such strong association with
urban communities made positive civic perception essential. The exceptional performance of the
Southern Methodist football team provided Dallas residents’ vital, positive national exposure.
The relation of the Mustang football team to Dallas situated the athletic contests as more
than simple games. Southern Methodist provided the city and its citizens a sense of selfimportance. Every SMU gridiron triumph appeared in national newspapers and presented the
community in a positive manner, thus the nation began to associate Southern Methodist and
Dallas with success. If the team wins, the city is victorious and vice versa. From this perspective,
one can better understand the passion that becomes associated with college football in the
urbanized nature of the United States in the 1920s. The citizens of Dallas felt the reputation of
the football team directly reflected their own national standing.
There was no doubt that the Southern Methodist Mustangs were one of the strongest
football outfits in the Southwest, but progressive Dallasites desired national notoriety. SMU
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possessed yet another undefeated record at the conclusion of the 1924 season, and the Dixie
Classic invited the team to participate in its postseason bowl game to be played in Dallas. The
contest served as an invaluable opportunity for the Mustangs to test their merit on a national
stage against a strong West Virginia Wesleyan squad. The New Year’s Day affair presented a
hefty challenge, as the eastern opponent possessed two losses to quality opponents and were
“one of the strongest of the Atlantic section teams of the year.”
Many local residents viewed the contest as a regional clash. “Southwest battles East,”
proclaimed Dallas Morning News sportswriter William Ruggles, who determined the contest to
be, “the biggest (game) played on a conference gridiron this year,” and even mentioned the
generosity and selflessness of the SMU players for “sacrificing their Christmas holidays to earn
the university funds for a badly needed gym.” The benevolent tone employed by Ruggles
displayed how the academic scandal that plagued the program two years prior was nothing more
than a distant memory. The national notoriety that would come with victory served as the only
concern facing SMU and its supporters. 37
Unfortunately, the Southern Methodist football team proved unable to maintain its
momentum, as West Virginia Wesleyan defeated the Mustangs by a nine to seven margin.38 The
SMU football program accomplished much in a short period, but their recognition extended no
further than the Southwest. Expectations for a national championship failed to exist – a season of
the highest caliber involved beating all opponents on the schedule and winning a SWC title.
Though Ray Morrison’s football team, Southern Methodist, and Dallas progressed immensely in
a short time, the expectations remained low in regards to their position in the national landscape
of college football.
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Despite the minor setback, in 1926, Ray Morrison and his Mustangs persevered and
produced arguably their best season to date. SMU again compiled an undefeated campaign and
wrapped up the SWC title two weeks prior to the season’s end. A crowd of over 19,000
supporters watched the Mustangs clinch the conference championship with a resounding thirtyone to three victory over Baylor – the worst loss the Bears had ever endured in a conference
game.39 The win proved so decisive that Milt Saul, the sports editor of The Dallas Morning
News, declared the contest “the most impressive victory the Red & Blue warriors have won in
the history of their institution…and was the finest exhibition of football particularly by the
Mustangs ever staged on a Dallas Field.” 40 SMU had again provided its home city with a sense
of satisfaction. Dallas citizens personally invited Mustang players to private parties in their
homes and the city’s Baker Hotel hosted an extravagant party dubbed “The Football Feed.”41
Though the success of the 1926 season brought SMU and Dallas unprecedented accolades, the
Mustangs were presented with an even more advantageous challenge the following season.
SMU had performed admirably within its own conference but the Missouri Tigers – the
1926 Missouri Valley Champions – served as the Mustangs most daunting challenge yet. The
early season opponent possessed national clout for its performances against quality eastern
schools and the dominant fashion in which Missouri won their conference the year prior. Temple
Howard of The Semi-Weekly Campus declared that Coach Morrison must “use every trick in the
bag” to defeat such a “worthy foe.” Howard continued by stating that the Missouri Valley squad
consisted of “twenty-eight of the best players that have ever played for the Tigers,” but a victory
in the contest “would mean probably as much for the Mustangs as winning the Southwestern
39
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Conference.” According to the student writer, a Mustang triumph placed the team “in the class
with the Eastern and Northern teams.” A victory would mean that “Southern Methodist
University would be recognized all over the country as an outstanding school.”42 The student
body and the Dallas community understood the important national promotion that would come
with a SMU victory.
In what The Dallas Morning News dubbed, “probably the greatest offensive game ever
played in Texas,” SMU easily defeated Missouri 32-9 at Dallas’ Fair Park. The convincing
victory dramatically boosted the confidence of the Mustangs’ supporters, as it now seemed
comprehensible for Dallasites to promote their team as one of the nation’s finest. Despite the
inability of the Mustangs to win the conference title in 1927, the Salesmanship Club of Dallas
expressed “its pride of the achievements of the coaching staff of the S.M.U. football team and of
the entire team.” They deemed the season a success due to the “distinctly civic achievement in
which the entire city takes pride.”43 Once again, the team carried the city of Dallas to glory, but
the Salesmanship Club made sure that all knew the Mustang’s performance was the effort of the
entire city and not just the athletes on the field.
In part due to SMU’s performance against Missouri, national collegiate football experts
began to take note of the quality football present in the Southwest. Princeton coach W.W. Roper
revealed that he sent a scout to the Southwest and decided to share the findings since “we have
heard little of this section (and) I believe publication of the facts will do much to open the eyes
of those in regions where football is older.” According to Roper’s associate, Southwest
Conference officials and fans believed 1927 the most successful season for the region to date,
and the quarterback of Southern Methodist, Gerald Mann, should receive consideration for first
42
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team All-American honors. Furthermore, the rapid improvement of quality football in the region
and the improving “attendance marks” fascinated the coach.44 Roper represented the Northeast,
the old establishment of collegiate football, and for the Princeton coach to take notice of the
progress ongoing in the Southwest proved substantial. Thus, by the late 1920s Southwest football
was receiving its first notions of national respect.
In addition to Roper, the New York Times began to take note of Southwest Conference
football, and specifically the Southern Methodist Mustangs. At the conclusion of 1927, the paper
analyzed the records of college football teams from all regions over the previous five seasons.
The Times concluded that though “it will come as something of a shock to the ancient gridiron
strongholds,” the closest rival to that of the esteemed Notre Dame Fighting Irish was the
Southern Methodist Mustangs. When the national publication objectively printed SMU’s record
of thirty-four wins, five loses, and seven ties – an eighty-seven percent winning percentage – the
publicity received proved invaluable.45
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the 1927 season, a high profile transition occurred
within the Southwest Conference. John Heisman, who earlier in the decade declared quality
football would never occur in the Southwest, retired from coaching after a dreadful three-year
tenure at Rice University in Houston. Heisman proved unable to adjust to Southwestern
Conference football and posted a record of four wins, eleven loses, and a single tie.46 The
unbiased report of SMU as the second-best college football team over a five-season period and
the failure of Heisman, a representative of the established elite of Eastern football, presented
Southern Methodist and Southwest football as a significant participant in the national college
football discussion.
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While the Southern Methodist triumph over Missouri proved significant for Dallas, the
post-season East-West Shrine Game in San Francisco served as perhaps the most beneficial
promotion for the Southwest football community thus far. While promoters presented the contest
as a charity event to raise money for disabled children, the East-West game meant much more
than an exhibition for its Texas participants.47 The game presented an opportunity for
southwestern athletes to display and compare their talents to so-called “superior” athletes from
the East.
Taking advantage of the opportunity, the West team convincingly defeated the East
sixteen to six. Texans scored fourteen of the West’s points and SMU’s Gerald Mann scored
twice – once on an early ten-yard touchdown catch and then a fifteen-yard run later in the
game.48 The Semi-Weekly Campus proclaimed that Mann’s heroics “established an everlasting
reputation for S.M.U. and the state of Texas.” The Southern Methodist campus greeted Mann as
a hero upon his return to Dallas, providing him with a standing ovation when he entered a
campus chapel to recount the West’s victory. During his public appearance, Mann stated “the
thing that impressed (him) the most was the part the Texas boys were given in the game. More
publicity was given the Texas men than any others.”49
Sports journalists proved Mann’s assessment correct, as news outlets from across the
country raved about the “four obscure players” from “four obscure Texas colleges” who “stole
the thunder of the great football stars of the year, East, West or anywhere.”50 The San Francisco
Call glowingly remarked that, “After all Texas is the place where the West begins. And Texas
evidently begins to play football where the others leave off.” The West Coast paper continued by
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admitting that “The West is deeply indebted to Texas today for having preserved its gridiron
dignity yesterday against the greatest aggregation of Eastern star football players to ever invade
the Pacific Coast.” The Call believed that after the dominant performance of the Texas football
players, it would be wise for “some…to get a game with one of those Rio Grande academies for
the edification of football hereabouts.”51
According to Robert Sensender of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, boisterous Texas
Christian University end Raymond “Rag” Matthews stole the show. Sensender proclaimed
Matthews the most dominant athlete on the field and “not only the greatest end of 1927,” but also
“one of the greatest (ends) of all time.” At the conclusion of the contest, the TCU end
downplayed his performance, stating he “was just playing mediocre football…you all come
down to Texas some time and we’ll show you some real football.” 52
The obscurity of these Southwest stars fascinated Sensender. He noted that “The funny
thing about these Texas players is that they were as little known here on the Pacific Coast as in
the Middle West and East. Texas plays ‘in its own league’.”53 This post-season charity contest
opened the eyes of many collegiate football fans. On a national scale, this contest served as the
most rewarding moment to date for Southwest college football. Not only was the East expected
to win, their star athletes were supposed to dominate. The New York Times determined the
Eastern squad possessed “some of the finest players developed in the East in years,” yet the West
prevailed in dominant fashion.54
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The East began to notice Texas football, and the Southwest began to realize that perhaps
they belonged at the forefront of national college football commentary. As Mann informed the
chapel audience at SMU, “Despite the fact that the Eastern players and games have gotten more
publicity than the West, the Southwest Conference is far ahead in the kind of football played. It’s
a different kind and I think it’s the kind of football that will eventually be played everywhere.”55
Southern Methodist’s wide-open passing attack – the “aerial circus” – was “the kind of
football played” to which Mann alluded.56 The offensive philosophy became a staple of both Ray
Morrison and the Southern Methodist football program, and furthermore, the style of play
cultivated national interest for the entire Southwest football community.
The legend goes that when Ray Morrison regained control of the SMU varsity team
in1922, he realized that his undersized squad could not compete with the much heavier defensive
fronts they would face during the upcoming season.57 The coach possessed a quick team and a
quarterback capable of throwing an accurate pass, so Morrison devised an offense he believed
would allow his team to compete with superior competition. After observing other teams resort
to the forward pass when faced with a deficit late in games, Morrison noticed that the aerial
attack frequently yielded immediate success despite the defense expecting the particular style of
play. The SMU coach concluded that surely his teams could have success throwing the ball
when the opponent was oblivious to the pass. The revelation inspired the coach to develop an
offense that featured thirty to forty forward passes per game.58
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Furthermore, the aerial attack eliminated the detrimental effects of the hot Southwestern
climate. As Southwest sports journalist Kern Tips explained, “a practical reason” for a passing
offense “was to beat the heat and humidity of the Southwest’s football season climate.” Tips
determined that the “maneuvering” associated with the passing offense “put less premium on
juggernauting in the muck of the line that saps stamina and drains desire.”59 Morrison’s strategy
served to counter a longtime foe of Southwest football teams: the weather.
While the Mustang’s size and the weather certainly factored into Morrison’s choice to
implement his famed passing offenses, the tale of the coach inventing the widespread passing
attack is exaggerated. Though the celebrated coach contributed to the popularity of the offensive
weapon, the forward pass had served as a component of the game since its legalization in 1906.
Facing a public relations crisis due to numerous deaths associated to the violent nature of the
run-heavy offenses utilized in early college football, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
rules committee legalized the overhead pass in hopes of spreading out the players and decreasing
the sport’s brutality.60 Teams immediately began taking advantage of a new offensive weapon
that proved particularly popular among 1920s American society.61
Prior to the 1920s, football supporters enjoyed the run-heavy offenses employed by many
early teams. The struggle and power associated with the ground-and-pound attack situated the
sport as both a test of man’s brawn and his character. While gridiron teams never ceased the
employment of running plays in their offenses, the 1920s ushered in a more modern society
59
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fascinated with the scientific efficiency associated with businessmen such as Henry Ford and
Frederick Taylor.62 The craft-innovation of a passing offense, the intelligence and efficiency
necessary to design and successfully execute such a style of play, satisfied the craving of a more
modern American society.63
The forward pass injected excitement and unpredictability into the sport. Former SMU
cheerleader Jack Thread recalled, “We were a real drawing card where we went. While teams all
over the nation were slugging it out on the ground, people came to see our wide-open passing
game.”64 When Morrison’s squad lined up for an offensive snap, not only were defenses
wondering what was to come, but also audiences sat on the edge of their seat not sure what to
expect. The forward pass created the opportunity for touchdowns to occur at any moment and
any place on the playing field.65 Even the nickname bestowed upon SMU’s offense, “the aerial
circus,” implied fans observed something atypical. One attended something greater than a
football contest; they were to be entertained in a circus type atmosphere.
Many sportswriters deemed Ray Morrison as the “father of the forward pass” and
inventor of the wide-open style of play.66 As previously mentioned, while the coach’s offenses
did possess an increased use of the forward pass, Morrison’s role in the development of the
technique should not be exaggerated. Prior to his tenure at SMU, other teams and regions
employed complicated aerial schemes and many aspect of Morrison’s offense were borrowed
philosophies. Moreover, depending upon the competition, the Mustang’s game plan occasionally
featured more running plays than anything else. However, the media dubbed SMU as the “aerial
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circus” and Ray Morrison embraced his part in the story.67 The excitement and spectacle
generated by the narrative attracted more local and national fans to the southwestern collegiate
game. Therefore, the passing attack, whether exaggerated or not, of the 1920s SMU Mustangs
directly influenced the growth of collegiate football in the Southwest.
Furthermore, the “aerial circus” narrative offered American society something they
desperately craved: a distraction. The United States’ economic prosperity during the 1920s
certainly provided many citizens an improved standard of living and an increased amount of
leisure time. However, this ideal situation created a national sense of complacency, which in turn
led to a communal desire for escapism and adventure. Thus, the exciting aerial attack of SMU
supplied the superfluous entertainment craved by the American public during the decade.68
SMU’s “aerial circus” not only contributed to the growth of football, it provided Ray
Morrison a fresh start. When Morrison resumed coaching the Southern Methodist football team,
his two unsuccessful seasons – in 1915 and 1916 – went unmentioned. The Dallas Morning
News stated that Morrison left SMU to enter the Army and assist in its YMCA program.69 While
the Mustang coach did in fact take the military assignment, he acquired the position only after
SMU forced him out. By 1925, the tension between the university and Morrison proved
nonexistent. The 1925 edition of the S.M.U. Athletic Review declared Morrison the “smartest
coach in the Southwest.” The publication continued by deeming him “the most popular man on
the campus….He is known as a coach, a star athlete, and a prince of a fellow.”70 Morrison
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became synonymous with success during his second tenure as head coach and compiled an
impressive record of eighty-one wins, thirty-one losses, and twenty ties.71 In addition to this
impressive record, Morrison helped supply Southern Methodist University, Dallas, and the
Southwest something even more substantial: a college football identity.
As explained by college football historian Michael Oriard, “Every community had its
own football culture, shaped by its own and its region’s history, its resources, its civic
aspirations, and countless other factors….” Unfortunately, for the Mustangs and the Southwest, a
gridiron culture failed to exist at the beginning of the 1920s. This changed as soon as the “aerial
circus” mantra began to spread across both the region and the nation. A passing offense,
regardless of the frequency it was employed, came to define college football teams in the region,
all of whom embraced the label the media placed upon them. By the end of the decade, the
Southwest became associated with the aerial style of play.72
Texas and wide-open passing proved a compatible pairing. In an article entitled “S.M.U.
Found Moses in Morrison,” a former Southern Methodist player proved exceeding over-the-top
when recalling his former coach’s career in the 1920s. The former Mustang recalled that when
Morrison began to design his offense, the coach planned “a type of football play that would
appeal to these wild Texans….He noticed that the state was large and open and everyone was
infected with an unlimited vision that wouldn’t stand orthodox lines or channels.”73
Exaggeration aside, the article proves telling on numerous levels. The former player
described the offense and Texas as a predestined match – a perfect fit introduced by a football
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prophet. Furthermore, sportswriters from other sections frequently depicted the SMU overhead
attack as a “Wild West shoot-out.”74 The article appears to accept this description of the “wild
Texan” athletes rather than reject the absurd claim. Because the cowboy imagery provided its
participants a unique characteristic found in no other regional football community, southwestern
football proponents tended to embrace the title. Moreover, the national media and southwestern
football supporters accepted the wide-open passing game as their football culture – their identity.
To be defined as a specific football community represented initiation into the national football
landscape and it situated the Southwest as a respected and unique piece to an increasingly
diverse athletic phenomenon.
In the inclusive regional football community, perception mattered. The notion that SMU
reverted to a passing game due to inferior physicality not only displayed disrespect toward the
Mustang athletes, but also toward Southern Methodist University, Dallas, and the entire
Southwest. The previously mentioned former Mustang player clarified that he did not “mean that
Texas can’t take it, to the contrary, they enjoy a good scrap, but it’s not just football in the
Southwest Conference – it is comparable to a ‘Kentucky Feud.’”75 The fact that the veteran
athlete felt the necessity to justify the Southwest Conference’s style of play displays the
importance a positive façade was to regional football communities.
In the second game of the 1928 season, the identity of Southern Methodist and the
Southwest Conference faced perhaps its toughest and most opportunistic challenge when the
Mustangs confronted Army – one of college football’s most tenured powers. According to
Princeton Coach W.W. Roper, just the ability of Southern Methodist to appear on the Army
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schedule displayed the Southwest Conference’s rapid ascent in collegiate football.76 If the
Mustangs could pull off the upset, the consequences would prove monumental for the entire
football community. In agreement with Roper, The Semi-Weekly Campus noted that the Army
game displayed “S.M.U.’s rise in the collegiate world.” The school paper proclaimed, “Southern
Methodist University…is rated among the phenomena in the educational world. Established
thirteen years ago, it has achieved enrollment of more than 3300 students annually, more than
two million in endowment, and a preeminent position in Southwestern football.”77
The contest against the Cadets from West Point, New York provided SMU the
opportunity to challenge itself against the best of the East and expand its aspiration beyond a
Southwest Conference title. A victory could potentially place the Mustangs in the conversation
for a national championship.78 The ability for SMU, a school that began fielding a football team
less than fifteen years prior, to be in such a position proved remarkable. Several months prior to
the actual contest, the prospect of national notoriety sent the citizens of Dallas into frenzy.
Coach Morrison tried his best to control the overzealous hype surrounding the game. In
June of 1928, four months prior to the intersectional battle, he identified the long travel to New
York, the inability for the Mustang team to condition during the summer months like Army, and
playing in an unfamiliar climate as just some of the “long odds” his squad faced. The coach
deemed those who “even indicate now that we should beat or tie the Cadets” as “foolish.”79
Despite his best efforts, Morrison proved unable to quell the “ballyhoo.” “Beat Army” served as
the rallying cry during the initial practices of the 1928 season, and Business Manager of
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Athletics, Doc Blackwell, declared the contest against the “Army football gladiators…the
greatest intersectional football game in the history of the Dallas institution.”80
Football proponents across the country became intrigued not only about the Mustang
team, but also Southern Methodist University and Dallas. Taking advantage of the opportunity to
introduce their institution to the nation, the university produced a thirty-seven page pictorial
pamphlet in response to the numerous requests for information about the new Texas school.81
The challenge against the Cadets served as a momentous opportunity to advertise the university
to the nation.
With enthusiastic anticipation plentiful, the week of the game finally arrived. To ensure
support for the visiting team, Dallas businessman Bill Hitzelberger arranged for four special
trains to transport seven hundred and fifty fans from Texas to New York. At first, Southern
Methodist refused to encourage travel to the away contest and determined that the classes
students missed would not be excusable, but the fervor of the game proved even too
overwhelming for the administration. By the week of the contest, SMU announced study hours
would occur on the train and credit would be given to all students attending the intersectional
affair.82
Everyone involved with Southwest Conference football began to comprehend the
national implications of a SMU victory against Army. A positive performance from the
Mustangs ensured considerable positive advertisement for the university, city, and region. “New
Yorkers take a certain sectional pride in the West Point football team,” declared student
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journalist William Roach. “In a sense it is ‘their eleven.’ Men who cannot boast college
affiliations find a vicarious outlet for their emotions by shouting for West Point. Therefore it will
be a game sectionally between the East and the Southwest, but the eyes of the United States will
be focused on the game.” Southern Methodist was to perform on their grandest stage yet, as the
importance of the contest surpassed any the Mustangs had participated in prior.83
Once the Southern Methodist contingent reached New York City – their stop for the night
before heading by boat to West Point the day of the game – the strange Texans mesmerized the
Yankees. Upon their arrival, the S.M.U. band blared their rendition of “Dixie” to announce the
Southerners arrival, and Mustang supporters gave “one long rebel yell” that “was repeated and
revolved into bedlam”84 The “thrill-wise” New Yorkers ran from the sidewalks in order to
observe the ruckus, and women even “held their babies out of…windows to see a real live
Texan.”85 The reaction solidified Gerald Mann’s comment from a year prior, “that whenever a
Texan goes east or west he attracts attention.”86 The SMU supporters displayed pride in their
status as an attraction and enjoyed the entertainment they provided to such a vibrant city. Just
like their team, they attempted to produce a spectacle.
In an effort to provide support from afar, Western Union issued an ad in the Dallas
Morning News that encouraged local residents to send messages of encouragement to the team
prior to kickoff.87 SMU supporters complied and sent numerous telegrams and letters to the
southwestern athletes. Team captain, Earl “Ug” Baccus, received telegrams stating everything
from “We know you will win, Texas first last and always” to “don’t fail us.” In an extremely
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passionate two-page letter, M.F. Armstrong – a Texas oil investor – encouraged Baccus to
channel the spirit and confidence displayed by “Rag” Matthews in the East-West game.
Furthermore, Armstrong attempted to supply additional confidence by declaring the Mustangs
“as good as any team in the United States.”88 In addition to fan support, players on other Texas
teams, and athletic officials representing nearly all the Southwest Conference institutions,
encouraged the team to “stay in there and battle for Texas,” and “battle for the prestige” of the
Southwest.89
The zealous regional support revealed that the contest spread well beyond SMU and
Dallas. Southern Methodist depicted the game as “an effort to prove to the country that
Southwestern Conference teams are as good as the best,” and boldly proclaimed that the
challenge was “not a school undertaking, or a civic undertaking, or a state undertaking but
something that the entire Southwestern section of the country will be interested in and
supporting.”90 The game between the Army Cadets and the Southern Methodist University
Mustangs had morphed into a contest for the relevancy of the Southwest football community.
Finally, the sixth of October arrived, and a confident SMU team descended upon West
Point on a cool, crisp fall afternoon. The Mustangs ignored the large, boisterous Army rooting
section and quickly initiated their razzle-dazzle offense, consisting of a bewildering array of
forward passes and multiple laterals. Ray Morrison’s squad shocked the Army team, scoring a
quick touchdown in the first five minutes of the game. Remarkably, the SMU offense was not
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finished. Morrison’s men entered the Army end zone for a second touchdown shortly following
their first. The Mustangs found themselves in somewhat of a dreamland – Southern Methodist
decisively led the vaunted Army attack thirteen to zero and the Cadets had no answer for the
Texans’ unorthodox style of play.91 “The Army knew what was coming and yet they couldn’t
break up Morrison’s passing attack,” observed Grantland Rice. “The “stout” Cadet defense
looked “dizzy most of the game.”92
Though they were rattled, Army would not relent and eventually took a 14-13 lead in the
second half. In the game’s final minutes, the Mustangs found themselves on offense and quickly
ascending upon the Army goal line, but time ran out before the squad could properly conclude its
Cinderella story.93
The performance of Ray Morrison’s team shocked the East and opened the eyes of
national football supporters unaware of the Southwest’s “football culture.” The Times-Picayune
noted the amazement of New Yorkers in attendance as they witnessed “passes…that began
anywhere and ended in the same place.”94 Despite the confusion, the easterners proved
exhilarated by what they had witnessed and shocked by the brand of football produced from the
Southwest. National sportswriters even felt “compelled to admit there are other sections of” the
country “where real football is played.”95 Though Morrison’s teams did not always employ the
aggressive passing attack the media associated them with, against Army, the frequency proved
substantial. Regardless of the game plan’s intention, the utilization of the wide-open attack was
an important display to the Northeast and its influential media market. The coverage of the
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contest proved significant in spreading the lore of an aerial Southwest football community: the
identity continued to cultivate and flourish.
Despite the loss, the proud Mustang supporters treated their team as victors, and “some
fifteen hundred admirers…gathered to pay tribute to the team” when their train returned to
Dallas. Local businessman Sol Dreyfus proclaimed that the game “was the most wonderful thing
that ever happened in football history…those Mustangs were heroes, every one of them.” In the
opinion of another Dallas resident, “our boys won, although they lost. That game which they
played was far more valuable than any mere score made by either team.” Mary Hay, Dean of
Women at SMU, reiterated the claim, determining that “Our victory over the Army was plainly
evidenced to all onlookers of the game. The score figures stood 14 to 13 but we know who were
the victors.” William Roach of Southern Methodist’s campus newspaper, The Semi-Weekly
Campus, determined that the win established the Mustangs “as one of the greatest elevens in the
country,” and not many football fans across the United States disagreed. 96 Three days after
SMU’s impressive performance, Secretary of War Dwight Davis managed a quick pit stop in
Dallas on a cross-country flight. When asked what he would like to do for his one-hour stay in
the city, Davis proclaimed that he wanted “to see the school that could send a football team to
West Point and play the Army in a 14-13 game.” He marveled that a “Southwestern university,
especially a school so young as S.M.U., had made such a good showing on its first appearance in
the East.”97
The Mustang’s season proved disappointing by its customary expectations – SMU was
unable to claim an undefeated season or a conference championship – but the 1928 Mustangs
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accomplished more for Southern Methodist, Dallas, and Southwest football than any team prior.
“Until the Mustangs swept up from Texas with their ‘razzle-dazzle’ attack…the elite East and
the hard-bitten North hadn’t paid much mind to Southwest football,” declared sports editor of the
Austin American-Statesman Weldon Hart.98 The national coverage and admirable performance of
SMU led to national notoriety and acceptance from the national football community. In seven
seasons, the Mustangs went from laughing stock to national power. Ray Morrison’s Mustangs
were without question part of the nation’s football elite.
The impressive Mustang performance solidified the “aerial circus” offense as the distinct
Southwest football identity, but many in the national football community proved suspicious of
the innovative offense. Columbia University head coach Charles Crowley claimed that the
passing offense had yet to hurt the sport, but he could “foresee that it will grow in usage and
there is danger that the game will develop into something far from what football has been.”99 The
traditional, old school contingent of collegiate football included men aligned with Crowley’s
outlook. The unknown developments that could potentially arise from the aerial attack frightened
the traditional faction of college football who tended to support the conservative, run-heavy
offenses popular in previous decades. The forward pass threatened to revolutionize the sport – a
notion traditional coaches were not ready to accept. Replicating 1920s American society’s
tension between modernity and traditionalism, the innovative passing game received consistent
backlash from proponents of conservative, run-heavy offenses that were employed most
frequently by traditional midwestern and eastern football powers.100
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Despite their differences in regards to style of play, both parties agreed that the East no
longer monopolized the preeminent collegiate football athletes or teams.101 Crowley noted that
teams in the East no longer viewed Southwest opponents as merely “good warm-up contests.”102
By 1929, the region garnered enough prestige that many regarded it “as being one of the
outstanding football sections in the country,” and the SMU Mustangs developed into one of “the
greatest and most colorful teams in American football.”103 The national standing of the Southern
Methodist football team and the Southwest football community drastically improved from their
dismal reputations at the decade’s beginning.
The notoriety the Mustangs bestowed upon the city of Dallas served as perhaps the most
significant development of SMU’s ascendance in the realm of 1920s collegiate football.
Reminiscing on the Mustang’s rise from obscurity, Dallas resident Bill McClanahan summarized
the city’s gracious attitude: “An athletic team, good and colorful enough to attract national
attention, has long been the cherished dream of every town and city…SMU’s Mustangs brought
just such national recognition to Dallas.”104 Similar to the rest of the country, football captivated
Dallas and the enthusiasm showed no signs of diminishing in the near future. Collegiate football
served as a true national phenomenon. At the conclusion of the 1927 season, Charles Crowley
eloquently summarized America’s attitude toward the child’s game. The coach explained that
football had become “an institution in the life of American youth. While the season is going on
there are times when those of us who have been at it for many years become weary of the
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struggle and the disappointments. When it is all over we feel glad of the rest before us. But,
when the Fall comes around again, when the leaves turn brown and when the weather turn cold
and crisp, we are eager for another season.”105
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Chapter Three
The 1929 Carnegie Report and the De-emphasis of Eastern Academia
In December of 1926, celebrated American author Upton Sinclair penned an article for
The Forum magazine determined to spark controversy yet again. The same writer who penned
The Jungle, a muckraking expose of the early twentieth century American meat-packing
industry, composed an article condemning what he believed to be one of society’s many ills: the
state of the American university. Sinclair, a fervent Socialist, related America’s institutions of
higher education to businesses that had profited off of World War I. The author considered
American universities extensions of capitalism’s evils, comparable to “a gigantic munition
factory” whose sole purpose was to produce “intellectual shells and gas bombs to be used on the
plutocratic side of the class war.” Furthermore, Sinclair deemed colleges the pawns of financiers
and industrialists, who utilized political machines to manipulate their respective alma maters in
order “to defend their property system and pass on their property tradition to the future.” In this
imbalanced world, genuine thought could not occur and thus it was the wish of the alumni “to
destroy thinking in colleges.” Football served as an instrument in accomplishing this destructive
objective.
Sinclair considered college football an exploitive event in which alumni “turn each
college into a competing unit, carrying on a miniature war with rival colleges, and diverting the
attention of the students to the raptures and agonies of this strife.” Alumni commercialized the
amateur game to draw large crowds that
drive the gladiators to more and more frenzied efforts and brutal treacheries which
cripple their rivals. The young heroes break their heart-valves and poison their kidneys
and weaken themselves for the rest of their lives….Already we have a number of colleges
which are nothing but honorific appendages to competing football teams, and we have
seen football players able to dispense entirely with the academic camouflage and go out
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into the capitalist world on equal terms with prize-fighters and motion picture stars and
developers of Florida subdivisions.
The author made it perfectly clear that he possessed no qualms with the sport as exercise
but rather the game’s “status of a business” and “pursuit of false ideals….”1 Although Sinclair’s
scathing review of collegiate football was more metaphorical than most, his stance proved
representative of many who wanted to reform the collegiate game. From the vantage point of
those unhappy with the direction of the sport, college football had become too commercial and
professional to the point that it compromised the academic integrity of higher education in the
United States. These reformers, consisting primarily of America’s educated elite, deemed the lax
admission standards given to promising athletes as diluting the intellectual rigor of American
colleges. In short, the over-emphasis provided to college football by 1920s society proved
injurious to the academic obligation of universities.
In the 1920s, college football’s impressive crowds, stadiums, and profits entranced a
majority of American society. However, distraught academic traditionalists lamented the
mounting attention the sport received and focused their energies upon restructuring the game
back to its amateur ideals. Most reformers could not deny that the discipline, fitness, toughness,
and teamwork associated with college football provided benefits to the maturation process of
young men, but the transformation of college football from a social activity to a highly
competitive, commercialized enterprise reflected aspects of American society they despised. The
1920s witnessed Americans growing more concerned with nurturing their bank accounts than
their minds – the liberal arts education that academics cherished went to the wayside, as
prosperous businessman took center stage. From the vantage point of conservative intellectuals,
college football became yet another detrimental aspect of a modern society driven by greed.
1
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While Sinclair’s scathing review certainly affected the efforts of reform-minded football
supporters, the article proved much less demeaning than the numerous controversial events that
occurred a year prior. In the fall of 1925, the initial shockwave of college football’s public
relations nightmare appeared in the form of a syndicated column entitled “The Story of a
Graduate Manager.” On the morning of August 23, 1925, Americans opened their newspapers to
the first of a twelve-part piece in which an anonymous graduate manager – the precursor to
today’s athletic director – revealed the collegiate game’s most severe evil: covert networks of
student underlings assembled to aid in the illegal recruitment and support of athletes.
Referred to by nicknames associated with their specific tasks, the undergraduate
assistants served as pawns of the graduate manager’s complex system devised to produce a
championship caliber collegiate football team. Students employed as “rats” made sure athletes
attended class, a “wet nurse” described a student tutor, and “widows” served as post-graduate
advisors who recommended the easiest courses offered and could pretty well predict what
material to expect on forthcoming exams.2 Furthermore, nearly every team possessed a group of
alumni who scouted the most promising high school football players and attempted to sway the
boys to their institution with promises of cozy jobs, free tuition, and/or financial stipends.
Students the graduate manager referred to as “uhlahs” proved even more effective than
older alumni. Captivating the high schoolers with the rev of an engine and a cloud of dust, these
undergraduates frequently visited the high schools of recruits with their loud cars. The “uhlahs”
sought to befriend the targeted athletes and transport the teenagers to university campuses where
they were introduced to the college experience – pretty girls, fraternities, and parties.3 If all went
to plan, the star prospect would be hard-pressed to decline the invitation of a coach when invited
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to join the team. The competition for star high school prospects became so intense that graduate
managers commonly hid their prized recruits at remote summer camps to keep other teams from
poaching the boys prior to the start of fall classes.
The clandestine recruiting and athlete support networks came with a hefty price tag,
which athletic department’s discretely subsidized in their annual report under vague subheadings
such as “rubbers” or “miscellaneous.” The graduate manager referred to this portion of the report
as “no man’s land.”4 Moreover, the highly organized operations were often viewed as charities
by the wealthy alumni who funded the athletic support networks. Rather than support the poor
and homeless, the businessmen provided money to skilled athletes so that their school would in
turn become a successful component of the national college football landscape.
Reaction to the article varied: reformers supported it, progressives questioned its validity,
and various regions claimed they were above it. Due to college football’s emergence as a
national sport played competitively in all sections of the country, every event was measured in
comparison to another region – the graduate manger’s story proved no different. In reaction to
the stench emitted by the syndicated column, the New Orleans based Times-Picayune announced
to its readers that the newspaper felt no need to print the feature in the South. “We down here in
Dixie don’t know much of what’s going on undercover with Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and other
such universities,” claimed a staff writer. “But it was because the story looked so overdrawn…
(and) because it had absolutely no connection with Southern intercollegiate football that the
Times-Picayune did not take it seriously.” Moreover, the publication boasted further that “in the
South, ninety-nine out of a hundred collegians are sent to school to be educated, rather than play
football.”5 The New Orleans sports journalists appeared to ignore the portion of the graduate
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manager’s tale in which he described civic leaders from “a small southern city” hiring a graduate
manger for $16, 500. The hired subsequently setup a vast recruiting network that led to both
athletic success and increased athletic subsidies.6 The steadfastness displayed by the newspaper
proved much more impressive than its reading comprehension.
Demonstrating the same opposition toward the article, supporters of midwestern football
tended to lash out at the graduate manager’s claims with even more vigor. Walter Eckersall of
the Chicago-Tribune proclaimed that the immoral activities did not exist in his region, as the
“Western Conference or Big Ten is as pure an organization as there is in the country.7 On the
contrary, the behavior did occur in the Big Ten, and probably in the region more so than any
other. But in this overly competitive world, regions strived to appear superior to others. In this
regard, Americans treated regionalism similar to college football: a winner and loser were
required, and perception mattered.
The article’s in-depth analysis of college football’s unethical behavior certainly enhanced
debates between reformers and progressives, but to most who read the article, the claims were
not a surprise. Sports fans proved well aware that institutions paid their football coaches more
than tenured professors, that illegal recruiting occurred at a high rate, that alumni interference ran
rampant, that athletes placed sports above school, and substantial gate receipts were collected.
Plain and simple, a majority of society did not care about the abuses. Reformers could chastise
the game all they wanted, but the public’s perception of college football was rarely altered.8
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In the 1920s, college football was the most popular intercollegiate sport by a substantial
margin. This presented the game as a valuable promotional tool - not only for respective
institutions but also entire regions. If a college deterred from these illegal practices, their team
failed to compete, and in a decade where spectacle and entertainment reigned supreme, losing
was not an option.9 Moreover, a winning football team was not cheap and success went hand-inhand with an athletic department’s profits. The more money an athletic department earned and
possessed, the more successful their team became.
The economic aspect of the supposedly amateur activity could not be ignored. As
historian Richard Davies explains, “The principles that underpinned the rise of intercollegiate
sports were the same that guided the American system of capitalism: competition and profits.”10
As the unnamed graduate manager explained, college football programs were now “high-geared
business organizations” in which control was “vested increasingly in alumni and in the
community outside the college.” Furthermore, the author estimated that it cost $25,000 to train,
equip, and condition an athlete at a big-time football university. In order for this operation to run
efficiently, the graduate manager, who could expect to earn a salary of as much as $18,000,
needed to be “a savvy business man” able to “learn the methods of complicating business
organizations.”11
In a bold close to his narrative, the graduate manager revealed that his “main contention
is that the changes which have come about in modern football follow closely the changes which
have taken place in general organization of life in America during the last few decades. It is
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inevitable that systems of education should reflect the life of the world around them.” The author
proclaimed that while some may deplore these changes to higher education,
in the last century when purely academic was quoted above par, the “humanities,”…were
good business; in these high-pressure days, the world rewards and youth wants money
and success...Isn’t it the business of an education to equip youth to survive and succeed in
his environment as it is, rather than it ought to be? I maintain that the high-geared,
competitive system of inter-collegiate athletics, with all its derivatives of high finance, is
more effective in preparing boys for life as they will find it than any system which places
the emphasis on the cultural rather than the practical...What I want to say is that alumni
and coaches and managers…are doing more for (boys) than the professors who are giving
them a bogus culture – bogus because it doesn’t deal with life as it is.12
In short, according to progressive proponents, a career in business provided a
substantially better opportunity for success in 1920s America than the antiquated humanities, and
big-time college football provided young men with a better chance to succeed in this businessdriven environment. The decade following World War I proved transformative and college
football was a both a force and a reaction to the substantial changes in American social values.
Many were skeptical of the article’s sincerity, as the “common sense” approach the
graduate manager claimed to utilize seemed more detrimental toward college football than
beneficial. Regardless, the message read loud and clear: college football had become big
business. In an analysis of the state of the game, New York Times reporter Alison Danzig echoed
the sentiment: “Football usually foots the bill for everything, and there is no factor like a winning
football team to win assistance for an endowment fund drive.”13
The contests’ economic motives were strongly influenced by the advertising and fund
raising techniques developed just prior to the decade’s commencement. A former college
football coach professed his belief that football games were conducted primarily to encourage
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alumni to pump money into their alma mater – a successful team made this much more likely to
occur. Furthermore, he believed the economic component of 1920s college football became
widespread due to the replication of the “drive” system employed during WWI fundraising
campaigns. The coach explained that universities established “teams, hired press agents,
something like Creel’s United States Publicity Bureau, and started out for a bankroll.” The
necessity of these positions arose in order to raise and manage the excessive funds the sport
generated.14
Moreover, traditionalists, perturbed with the collegiate game’s over-emphasis, failed to
comprehend, and were probably afraid to admit, the main culprit behind the phenomenon:
American society desired college football to become the finest spectacle imaginable and were
willing to pay top dollar to attend and maintain the show. In the 1920s, American society
transcended the businessman’s importance above that of the poet, the linguistic succumbed to the
jock, and immorality triumphed over ethics – football simply followed the trend. The prestige
associated with winning yielded higher enrollment, increased national branding, and motivated
nostalgic alumni to open their wallets on their alma maters’ behalf. The intellectual idealists
could gripe all they wanted, but the spectacle of the game infected the nation and a simple
remedy was nowhere to be found. Fans sought every opportunity to have their team deemed
conference and national champion; honor and sportsmanship be damned.
Moreover, no matter how desperately reformers wanted to look in the rear view mirror to
a time when college football served as an amateur pursuit, unaffected by financial incentive, the
“good ‘ole days” notion proved inaccurate.15 In reality, unethical activities existed since the
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introduction of intercollegiate athletics in the late-nineteenth century. As historian Ronald Smith
explains: “…the upper-class amateur ideal of participating for the enjoyment of the contest and
for no other motive, including financial considerations could not easily exist in a society whose
freedom of opportunity ideology allowed all to seek excellence through ability and hard work.”
The amateur-professional debate surrounding college sports survived from the inception of
American intercollegiate athletics, because while institutions felt the need to use amateur
language to protect their athletic programs, the innate American ideal to win and excel persisted.
A professional model proved much more ideal for this desire.16
The strong desire to win at all costs was not unique to the 1920s – it was an innate aspect
of American culture. However, the decade proved exclusive in that college football had become
widely publicized, played on a much more national scale, and involved many more participants.
As the game became more prominent, its controversies were illuminated. The ongoing battle
between reformers and progressives served as an ongoing attempt to find the balance between
freedom and control in college football – traditionalists sought to contain, while proponents of
the game worked vigorously to advance the sport. It appeared that the decade brought an
increased divide between the two forces. Moreover, the bickering tended to emulate 1920s
American society’s persistent dispute between traditionalism and modernity. The struggle over
college football’s future identity witnessed reformers fight for the tradition of an amateur,
academic-friendly game, while progressives sought a more professional and commercialized
modern spectacle.17
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Faculty proved the most vocal advocates for greater control over college football, and had
done so well before the transformative nature of the 1920s. In the late nineteenth century, a
concerned Oliver S. Jones claimed excessive emphasis surrounding collegiate athletics occurred
largely due to influences outside of universities. Jones determined that those foreigners
negatively affecting college football served as “the bane of our schools and college to-day.”18
Moreover, in 1905, Harvard president Charles Eliot stated that he believed “The game of football
has become seriously injurious to rational academic life in American schools and colleges, and it
is time that the public, especially the educated public, should understand and take into earnest
consideration the objections to this game.”19 At a 1906 University of Wisconsin alumni dinner,
respected historian Frederick Jackson Turner brazenly chastised the game, claiming that football
“has become a business, carried on too often by professionals, supported by levies on the public,
bringing in vast gate receipts, demoralizing student ethics, and confusing the ideals of sport,
manliness, and decency.”20 In response to his comments and efforts to disband the Wisconsin
football program, an angry mob of football supporters surrounded Jackson’s home in manic
protest – reformers and proponents in action!21
While reformers lamented the situation, proponents of the sport adamantly advocated the
game’s benefits. In a contemporary review of college football, Princeton coach William Roper
explained that he was “firmly of the opinion that the more we encourage healthful athletic
competition, the better citizens we make” and even claimed that “If prohibition is to be enforced,
I seriously believe athletics, and particularly football, can be of real help…Anyone who attempts
to play football even moderately well must be in the pink of condition, not only during the actual
18
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playing season but through the entire year….” Differing from reformers who desperately desired
to shorten the season, Roper believed the contests should occur “every Saturday during the
college year…The college or university undergraduate is not going to spend his entire time in
study. Nor do I believe he should. What is he going to do, then, when he is not studying?...
Football offers a partial solution.” Furthermore, he disagreed with those who claimed college
football’s motives to be solely financial. “The college football game is not run for profits,”
claimed Roper, and any money that was made was “managed as carefully as it would be in any
big business and applied scientifically to the general athletic needs of the university.”22 Taking a
drastically different stance toward American society’s fascination with business, Roper believed
the economic component was necessary for college football’s benefits to take effect.
Though Roper appeared to possess unquestioned faith in college football’s positive
influence upon young men, his opinion appeared in doubt when college football’s next public
relations nightmare of 1925 occurred. On November sixth, George Owen Jr., a former captain,
All-American, and recent graduate of Harvard, claimed that most college athletes disliked
playing football due to “the terrible grind necessary to keep in the running. The possibility of
failure preys so on the mind of the player that his capacity for enjoyment of the game is, in many
cases, completely lost.” Owen proved equally repulsed by the attitude of alumni toward the
sport. The former Harvard star claimed graduates’ enthusiasm made the games comparable to
gladiatorial combat of ancient Rome.23 Those who supported collegiate football had always
professed that amateur athletes played primarily because of their love for the game – Owen’s
comments illegitimated this notion. With his statements, the Harvard letterman spoke not only
for himself, but claimed that “other players” felt the same way. Furthermore, his criticism of
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alumni as the main culprits of players’ repulsion toward sport proved equally alarming. The exstudents always professed that they acted as beneficiaries toward young men, but the former AllAmerican’s claims argued that the game was no longer in the hands of undergraduates but rather
under the control of exploitative older men.
A couple of weeks after Owen’s comments, arguably the most glaring controversy
occurred when Illinois halfback Red Grange decided to turn professional prior to graduating
college. Grange was undoubtedly the most celebrated college football player of the 1920s and his
impressive performances on the field presented the “Galloping Ghost” as a household name. Late
in the 1925 season, rumors began to circulate that Grange was contemplating a move to the
professional ranks, and five minutes following his final game, still clad in his Illinois uniform,
Grange met with the media and made supporters’ fears a reality. The All-American announced
that he would play his first professional game the following week for the professional Chicago
Bears. The star athlete stirred the pot further when he stated that players played primarily for
their head coach more so than their university. “The institution was impersonal and remote in the
affections of the team,” claimed Grange.
The situation appeared promising for reformers who had long advocated that college
football was being played with the wrong intentions, however, the star halfback’s critique of a
university degree stung the educational elite as well. In defense of his actions, Grange claimed he
was only guilty of taking advantage of his natural athletic abilities in order to secure a more
promising future. Furthermore, early in his collegiate career, the halfback confessed that he
discovered “an arts degree isn’t worth a dime in business…I’m not ashamed of a thing I’ve done.
I think I showed common sense in cashing in on an asset after I have given everything I had to
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my university…I don’t owe the university a cent.” Grange admitted exactly what academia
hoped not to hear: a liberal arts degree was not a valued commodity. 24
As reporters began to comment on what had become one of the more popular topics in
the country, numerous national publications presented opinions on the All-American’s decision.
Most newspapers supported Grange’s decision, claiming that his right to take advantage of his
athletic abilities and move to the professional ranks would in no way damage the collegiate
game. William Roper took the same stance, claiming that the star halfback’s decision was solely
due to his enjoyment of the sport: “Football was his game, the breath of life to him and more
important than money.”25 Outlook magazine took a different approach, calling Grange’s decision
a blessing because it turned “the glaring sunlight on the gross commercialization of college
football.”26
Perhaps the most troubling observation of these reactions was that they focused solely on
how Grange’s decision impacted the status of college football – would the game survive or
flounder. Many commentators overlooked the fact that Grange decided against earning his
college degree. His decision proved much more indicative of universities than the sport of
college football, as it brought to light the nation’s growing disinterest with the value of higher
education. Spectacle, business, and promotion proved substantially more important.
After Ernie Nevers – a Stanford All-American – turned professional at the conclusion of
the 1925 season, University of California President W. W. Campbell had enough. Campbell
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pledged to do all he could “to prevent the University of California from becoming a prep school
for professional football.” He declared that the actions of Grange and Nevers would result in
“from the first days of high school, and possibly earlier, a great number of boys will be planning
to go to college with the idea of becoming football stars of sufficient magnitude to command
salaries in accordance with their dream of sudden wealth. Football will be made for the
universities: universities were not made for football.” Campbell fears were a great concern – had
the emphasis on football devalued higher education in the United States?27
Major John Griffith was perhaps the individual most concerned with Grange’s actions.
Griffith served as the commissioner of the Midwest’s Big Ten athletic conference – also referred
to as the Western Conference and more formally as the Intercollegiate Conference. The
commissioner’s involvement with college football traced back to the turn of the century, and he
proved a logical choice when the Big Ten sought to hire a full-time director of athletics
following damaging claims of illegal activities among conference institutions. In 1922, the Big
Ten appointed Griffith to clean up midwestern intercollegiate athletics and transform the
organization into an entity the region’s citizens could look upon with pride.28
Griffith hit the ground running and immediately began efforts to transform the Big Ten
into the nation’s cleanest athletic conference. The commissioner was aware that evils such as
illegal recruiting, gambling, and professionalism existed in the conference and needed to be
addressed. He commenced an educational campaign informing all those involved with the game
(spectators, fans, coaches, administrators, players, etc.) of various acts the Big Ten considered
improper. The effort proved substantial, and, in one instance, Griffith sent a memo regarding
illegal recruiting to approximately 10,000 high school principles. However, it should be noted,
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that the commissioner tended to promote educational awareness rather than pursue more
substantive acts such as punishing the guilty parties.29
Despite his recognition of the evils permeating college football, Griffith adamantly
believed that athletics served as an important component of university life, and that intellectual
pursuits should not serve as the end-all-be-all of collegiate life. In December of 1924, at the
annual meeting of the Football Coaches’ Association of America, Griffith boldly responded to
critics who claimed a dangerous overemphasis existed in college football, labeling them as
nothing more than “feminists, destructionists and educational communists.” Griffith appeared
fearless and ready to take on all the challenges reformers threw at the sport and his conference.
Prior to the 1925 season, Griffith even jovially predicted that the “Western Conference
will display a brand of football at least the equal of that of any other group of colleges in
America. The Middle West is rich in boy power and it would be difficult to find anywhere in the
world a finer group of young men than the 1,000 candidates who have registered for football in
the Western Conference.”30 In an environment where athletic conferences served as
representative of local football communities, any negative action associated with the conference
was taken as a slight against the entire region. The actions of Grange, an athlete on a Big Ten
team, placed Griffith, the conference, and the region in a troubling position.
In the enhanced debate between college football reformers and progressives during the
1920s, Griffith was not the only individual facing trying circumstances. In his study on the rise
of big-time college athletics, sports historian Ronald Smith explains that, “Individually,
university presidents have never been able to control intercollegiate athletics” because they are
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usually “caught between demands of the faculty on the one hand and the demands of the
governing board on the other.”31 University presidents found themselves in the cross hairs
between intellectual and athletic pursuits on college campuses, and oftentimes, they proved
directly responsible for the decline of universities’ intellectual pursuits. Speaking anonymously
on the increased commercialization of 1920s college football, a former coach believed university
presidents were “no longer representative of a scholarship tradition, rooted in conventionality,
idealism, Greek, Latin and three modern languages. College presidents are now chosen because
they are handshakers, go-getters and business men who can panhandle endowments…. Such a
college president is forced to recognize that it is impossible to build up endowments without
athletics to ballast and advertise the appeal for funds.”32 Such was the delicate situation of the
university’s leadership – trying to keep everyone happy created a very slippery situation. While
academics served as the university’s primary purpose, athletics created publicity, increased
enrollment, and generated larger donations from alumni. Colleges found themselves in a similar
situation to the rest of American society: they were businesses and needed to be run as such.
One individual confronted with this difficult dilemma was Ohio State University
President George Rightmire, who faced a difficult circumstance when he took over as the
university’s president in 1926. The Ohio State football team had achieved resounding success the
decade prior, but after winning the Big Ten championship in 1916, 1917, and 1920, the team’s
record began to steadily decline.33 The situation proved demeaning for many invested alumni and
31
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local supporters, and Rightmire began receiving numerous letters of grave concern. Following
the 1925 season, one such letter sent by the Toledo Ohio State Alumni Association claimed
concern regarding the future direction of the Buckeye football program. In order to rectify the
situation, the Toledo alumni recommended a meeting between the university’s athletic board and
representatives of the various Ohio State alumni associations. Surely, Rightmire wanted to keep
the alumni pleased because of the financial support they provided, but by all accounts, he seemed
to side more with reformers’ fear of overemphasis on sport at university campuses. The president
appropriately replied that the faculty were content with the direction of the program and believed
it misguided to determine success by wins and losses: “Under the present situation that has
seemed to be unescapable but the trend of Faculty thought is entirely away from these
commercial and professional features.”
While Rightmire’s defiant stance proved admirable, it ignored the irony of the collegiate
game: its emphasis on competition. Recognizing its opportunity, the Toledo alumni responded
that although the “universities of the Western Conference take no cognizance of championships,
they do in practice, play and claim championships in football and other lives of athletics. Their
method of conducting intercollegiate football has aroused the utmost public interest in the game.
An interests which, we submit, cannot be ignored by the universities….”34 The Toledo group
was correct. By emphasizing a champion at the conclusion of each season, the sport implied that
victory does in fact matter. This was the dilemma facing college football in the 1920s, its
emphasis on victory and defeat made it much more relatable to the decade’s business-influenced
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desire for profit, growth, and success, rather than an academic community still steeped in
traditional liberal arts values.
Following 1925’s disturbing episodes, issues of commercialization, professionalization,
and over emphasis proved as present as ever.35 The game appeared out of the universities’
control and firmly coordinated by the actions of alumni; even worse, the game increasingly took
the shape of the business world that served as the antithesis of a liberal arts education. In reaction
to the travesties affecting the supposedly amateur game, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association asked the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Learning to conduct a
national study on the state and influence of athletics in American schools – on January 8, 1926,
the organization accepted the athletic governing body’s request.36
The Carnegie Foundation served as the nation’s leading promoter of higher education
reform. Regarding intercollegiate athletics, the organization’s stance proved far from cordial,
and, in 1924, the foundation had even issued a brief report that designated “commercialism,”
excessive expenditure of money,” and “too great an insistence on turning out a winning team” as
the most problematic issues in college sports.37 Furthermore, the organization’s president, Henry
Pritchett, obstinately sought “elite no-nonsense education” in American universities and college
football served as a hindrance to his efforts. Pritchett believed an emphasis on athletics
contributed to a rise in lower college admissions standards that “diluted the intellectual integrity
of academic life.”38
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To make matters worse for progressive proponents, Howard Savage – a young social
science researcher – was the man selected to lead the team of researchers set to investigate the
nation’s athletic programs. Like Pritchett, Savage hailed from the Northeast and was a strong
advocate of highbrow education; this, coupled with his ability to conduct a thorough
investigation, proved a nightmarish combination for proponents of big-time college football. For
the collegiate game, if the Carnegie Foundation was the cemetery and Pritchett its caretaker,
Savage certainly possessed the ability to serve as gravedigger.
Initially, Savage handled the study in the same manner as a 1924 investigation of
athletics he conducted in Great Britain – the social scientist distributed questionnaires to various
institutions inquiring about the inner workings of their respective athletic programs. The
feedback proved unfruitful. Concerned with the intent of the investigating committee, many
schools were standoffish and created a more difficult effort for the team. In an attempt to
improve the situation, Savage decided that he and his four-man group would visit 130 colleges,
universities, and a few high schools to personally interview college officials, athletic personnel,
students, and alumni for a more effective and “unprejudiced” investigation.39 The Carnegie
researchers’ action was evidence that the investigation was one to be taken seriously; university
and conference officials took note.
In 1926, a concerned John Griffith acquired various excerpts from Savage’s initial
findings and relayed the information to Big Ten member presidents and athletics directors. The
discoveries focused mainly on issues of illegal recruiting and concluded that in many instances:
“Everybody, including the President and the Deans knows that alumni and business men are
subsidizing football players at this university. No objections have been made.” Yet another
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report found that many college administrators determined that the proselyting of athletes was an
essential evil because “competition and like practices of other colleges make it absolutely
necessary.” Griffith closed his memorandum to Big Ten officials by stating “there will be
considerable excitement when this report is made public, especially if the names of the
institutions are given. While we may congratulate ourselves that some of the conditions as stated
in these reports could not occur in the conference, yet conditions here in this section are not
entirely ideal and probably never will be.”40
Griffith appeared both confident and cautious. Optimistic that, in comparison to other
sections of the country, few wrongdoings occurred in the midwestern football community, yet
nervous because the evils that were present needed to be eradicated as quickly as possible. In the
wake of the investigation’s findings, the conference went on the offensive in order to defend
itself. While the commissioner considered the Big Ten’s recruiting situation improved, after
receiving a letter from a conference president informing him of rumors that “recruiting by
fraternities and alumni is growing more persistent and active, and the methods used are
becoming more questionable,” Griffith called for the Western Conference athletic directors to
meet with alumni leaders to fix the issue.41
Next, Griffith issued an in-house report on the state of recruiting in the Intercollegiate
Conference. Generally, the internal investigation yielded positive conclusions for the conference
and outlined all the actions taken to rid the organization of the few wrongdoings discovered.
Griffith concluded that the Big Ten’s three-year effort to end gambling and recruiting among its
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affiliated schools proved successful and the “improper proselyting throughout the Conference is
at a minimum…”
The report contained extracts from various investigators’ findings in an attempt to
legitimate the conclusions, but the publication’s sincerity proved suspicious due to only a single
report of illegal recruiting that an examiner declared to have been resolved. Regardless, Griffith
presented the report as a triumph for midwestern football, and declared that he felt “safe in
stating that every school in the Big Ten has a clear record….I am sure that the Big Ten is looked
up to as the cleanest athletic organization of the present day.”42 The bold statement placed the
conference’s, and the region’s, participants as clean of the illegal activity that tarnished the sport.
Like Griffith, George Rightmire demonstrated a strenuous effort to present his institution
in a positive light prior to the release of the Carnegie Report. At the conclusion of the 1926
season, the president of West Virginia Wesleyan claimed that all collegiate football players were
subsidized and it was about time that all associated with the game admit to commercialism in the
sport. Taking advantage of the confession, The New York World sent Rightmire and other
university presidents various questions regarding potential subsidizing of athletics at their
institutions. Rightmire definitively replied that “We guard against these practices by not
engaging in them. President of West Virginia Wesleyans statements may apply to his institution
but should be supported by evidence concerning others.”43
Rightmire presented his university as clean to the media, yet the next month, with the
Ohio State legislature set to investigate the university’s athletic finances the President sent a
message to athletic director L.W. St. John regarding the state of expenditures. He noted that this
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matter was worthy of conference so that everyone was on the same page. It seemed a stretch to
deem Ohio State clean when Rightmire proved “unaware” of the inner workings of his
university’s athletic department and demonstrated concern of what state representatives may
uncover.44
As the concerns of various football regions, conferences, and teams increased, the
Carnegie researchers’ investigation persisted. And finally, on October 23, 1929, after three and a
half years and a cost of $100,000, the Carnegie Foundation presented their findings and
conclusions to the public in a lengthy 347-page report that found the state of collegiate athletics
to be unacceptable.45 Savage revealed that ethical behavior and sportsmanship appeared
unimportant in comparison to the pursuit of victories and the earnings that came with them.
Furthermore, Savage and his team determined that at least three-fourths of the 130 institutions
they investigated jeopardized the academic integrity of their institutions due to the recruiting,
subsidizing of athletics, over-emphasis, and/or professionalism present at the schools.
Determined to include all of its findings, the report fervently provided in-depth accounts
of systematic cheating, extravagantly high coaching salaries, payment of athletes, excessively
large stadiums, and the recruitment of high school athletes – issues long known, but generally
ignored by an enchanted public. Though the sections on recruiting and the subsidizing of
athletics tended to receive the most attention, the publication examined a variety of topics
ranging from intramural sports to athletic training to medicine. One of the more fascinating
stories involved a coach injecting a player’s injured leg with cocaine so the pain would not deter
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him from entering an important game. Furthermore, the report focused on football more so than
any other sport.46
In the report’s introduction, Dr. Henry Pritchett claimed that the researchers conducted
the study with “no captious or faultfinding spirit,” and he referred to the conclusions drawn as a
“friendly effort” to find a solution to the present issues plaguing collegiate athletics.47 The
educational basis of the Carnegie Foundation and the scathing nature of the comments made
throughout the report suggested otherwise.
Savage refuted progressives opinion that college sports, and in particular football, proved
beneficial in improving a young man’s moral character, claiming that “our study of the recruiting
and subsidizing of college athletes affords much direct evidence that college athletics can breed,
and, in fact, have bred… equivocation and dishonesty, which actual participation has not
removed or prevented.”48 The investigator blamed the negative qualities hampering the sport on
the interest of the public at large because they aided the “commercialism, and the special
privileges of small groups of alumni” determined to ignore the intellectual components of higher
education.49
In the 1920s, the commercialism that consumed college football on a weekly basis every
fall proved ideal for an American populace obsessed with consistent thrills and spectacles. The
Report deemed society’s yearnings responsible for provoking those involved with the sport to
subsidize athletics and recruit players through networks of organized deception, which in turn
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created an atmosphere of “dishonesty, deceit, chicanery, and other undesirable qualities.” Savage
deemed this intentional rule breaking as “the darkest single blot upon American college sport.”50
The economic motivation of college football’s immoral recruiting networks appeared to
trouble Savage the most. According to the report, the solicitation of high school athletes had
reached “the proportions of nationwide commerce” and proved “noxious” to “the nature and
quality of American higher education.”51 It appears that what proved equally distasteful was the
fact that these networks proved reflective of the nation’s modern business society, with many
athletic associations even hiring advertising agents and publicity men to help peddle their
football programs. It was under these false pretenses of profit that “all considerations of
amateurism vanish under the pressure of commercial or business methods.”52 Savage even
referred to men who partook in acts of subsidizing athletics and recruiting as “the secret enemies
of the social order,” because they taught young athletes, the nation’s next generation of leaders,
that successful deception proved a worthy component of character in post-graduate life.53
Dr. Pritchett mourned the fact that “the independent college has not wholly escaped the
tendencies of the time,” as institutions of higher learning had been drawn “into the well-nigh
universal passion to exploit athletes and to offer courses in journalism or business or
salesmanship.” Pritchett expressed his uncertainty if the university, “whose primary purpose is
the development of the intellectual life can at the same time serve as an agency to promote
business, industry, journalism, salesmanship, and organized athletics on an extensive commercial
basis….Can a university teach equally well philosophy and salesmanship?”54 Furthermore, the
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Carnegie Foundation appeared most concerned with higher education following college
football’s path and becoming a commercialized institution. In a tone of desperation, Savage pled
for deterrence from an economic mindset:
More than any other force, [commercialism] has tended to distort the values of
college life and to increase its emphasis upon the material and the monetary…The
argument that commercialism in college athletics is merely a reflection of the
commercialism of modern life is specious. It is not the affair of the college or the
university to reflect modern life. If the university is to be a socializing agency worthy of
its name, it must endeavor to ameliorate the conditions of existence, spiritual as well as
physical, and to train the men and women who shall lead the nations out of the bondage
of those conditions.55
In this particular section of the report, Savage may have appeared to be discussing the
state of athletics, but his concerns gravitated above just sports. All of the aspects of the university
system, which included football, had been corrupted by modern American society. College
campuses no longer served as centers of intellectual pursuit where individuals went to increase
their self-worth and fulfillment. Too many young men were utilizing colleges and universities as
platforms to jump into a get-rich-quick business world that could care less about Shakespeare
and Aristotle.
In his introduction, Pritchett reminisced about America’s colleges in the past; founded on
the pillars of European education. He scoffs that when observing 1920s college athletics, a
European visitor proved confused and dumbfounded at the so-called “amateur” and “educational
activities” occurring before him. The men responsible for the Carnegie Report scornfully
ridiculed what collegiate athletics, and specifically football, had become: a commercialized and
professional pursuit foreign from academic interests. They not only challenged the direction of
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college football, but also combatted the state of modern American society in hopes that it could
somehow go back to valuing liberal arts.
What was necessary to remedy such a devastating situation? Savage spoke broadly about
the necessity for a greater regard for sportsmanship and following college football legislation
already in place. Pritchett spoke more specifically and radically, stating:
The paid coach, the gate receipts, the special training tables, the costly sweaters and
extensive journeys in special Pullman cars, the recruiting from the high schools, the
demoralizing publicity showered on the players, the devotion of an undue portion of time
to training, the devices for putting a desirable athlete, but a weak scholar, across the
hurdles of examinations – these ought to stop and the inter-college and intramural sports
be brought back to a stage in which the can be enjoyed by large numbers of students and
where they do not involve an expenditure of time and money wholly at variance with any
ideal of honest study.56
The Carnegie Report’s conclusions proved thorough and straightforward, but Savage
fought an uphill battle – American society was fascinated with the spectacle of sport. Even writer
John Tunis, a staunch proponent of reforming intercollegiate football, admitted that the findings
did not serve much of a purpose because the game had already been entrenched in the fabric of
society. Furthermore, in his commentary, Savage blamed the university faculty and presidents
for the game’s ills. By placing responsibility upon members of academia - potential allies in the
forthcoming backlash to the report – the Carnegie Foundation isolated itself.57 This served as one
of many blunders that made the report largely ineffective.
The Carnegie Report provoked heated disscussion for the remainder of the collegiate
football season, and, in response to its findings, most commentary proved quite sour. Many
individuals chastised the report’s conclusions due to Savage specifically naming offenders in the
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text. Had institutions been omitted from the Carnegie Report the negative reactions would have
been minimal. Furthermore, the listing of schools proved shocking and upsetting to many who
provided information to the investigators. Professor B.W. Griffith, the graduate manager of
athletics at Bucknell University, voiced his frustration to the New York Times: “The Carnegie
people assured us that specific names would not be mentioned. We gave them our help on that
basis…Now they have broken faith.”58 Other indicted schools proved equally infuriated with
Savage and his team after they had been assured that their athletic programs were clean, yet the
Carnegie Report stated otherwise.59
Despite the report receiving the largest reception of any that the Carnegie Foundation
published previously, the bulletin’s sizeable circulation had more to do with American society’s
obsession for sports rather than their concern for higher education. Plain and simple, Americans
did not care about Pritchett and Savage’s conclusions.60 Relaying the public’s stance, famed
American humorist and social commentator Will Rogers stated that though the Carnegie
Foundation found their answer regarding commercialism and professionalism in college sports,
“The public don’t care how you got to college, it’s how are you going to get from the 40-yard
line to over the goal that they are worrying about. We are a ‘get the dough’ people, and our
children are born in a commercial age.”61
Poor timing served as the Carnegie Report’s greatest hindrance, as the release date
coincided with the 1929 stock market crash. Public attention was elsewhere, and educators
concern for overemphasis on college sports proved secondary to the national crisis.62 Though the
unfortunate release date proved uncontrollable, the publication’s regrettable formatting was
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avoidable. The length and dense nature of the report demonstrated yet another blunder – not
many individuals would take the time to thoroughly examine a 347-page document.63
Some individuals and organizations did in fact endorse the report’s findings. For instance,
the NCAA unanimously approved the Carnegie Report during its 1929 meeting, and the
governing body even contemplated passing a resolution that would force accused member
schools to resign if they failed to put forth sincere efforts to remedy their offenses.64 However,
endorsers of the report found difficulty in promoting their critiques of the college football. While
many individuals criticizing the publication had the luxury of presenting their views in widely
read, football-friendly magazine and newspapers, the views of those offering criticism toward the
game often expressed their beliefs in “journals of opinion and…intellectual monthlies and
quarterlies,” all of which were narrowly read.65
To make matters worse, the Carnegie Report created a dangerous enemy with its criticism
of the newspaper industry. The bulletin placed partial responsibility for college football’s evils
on the media – an indictment journalist did not take well. Just as he had done with universities,
Savage mentioned guilty publications by name and noted that “the view of college presented in
newspapers is distorted through overstressing of athletics.” The New York Times, a newspaper
noted as increasing “its emphasis upon school and college sport,” defensively refuted the claim
and noted that the increase in coverage of sport was in reaction to the national interests of the
game – they were only giving the people what they desired. In fact, “most managing editors
would welcome the space released from college sports. They would also welcome more
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substantial news from colleges.”66 With its large readership, The New York Times was a poor
enemy to make when trying to influence public opinion.
However, proponents of the game still faced a crisis – scathing accusations directed
toward college football did not serve as ideal commentary. Throughout the 1920s, advocates of
the game consistently professed the sport as important to national character and preparing young
men for careers in business, while also providing discipline, structure, and the teamwork
necessary for maturation.67 With these ideals illegitimated due to charges of misplaced priorities,
poor sportsmanship, commercialism, and professionalization, many college football proponents
began to respond feverously.
University of Nebraska football coach Dana X. Bible responded to critics by claiming it
was his belief that the game was underemphasized and should be a required activity for every
male student on a college campus. The Cornhusker coach determined that “A successful man in
life must possess the virtues which football demands of a player. A college course that does not
include football instruction lacks this vital training.”68 Notre Dame coach Knute Rockne agreed
with Bible and believed those criticizing the sport were part of an American effeminizing trend.
In December of 1930, a year after the report’s release, Rockne told an audience in Buffalo, New
York that he believed college football was “not commercialized enough” due to the fact that
there were “only twenty-five out of a thousand colleges making any real money” off of the game.
Furthermore, the famed coach criticized university admissions for not admitting boys based on
athletic prowess as they do for academic ability. It was Rockne’s opinion that college admission
directors should not discriminate against a “brawny boy because he is not strong in math” or
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other subjects, because “four years of football are calculated to breed in the average man more
ingredients of success in life than almost any academic course he takes.” 69
Both coaches’ stance on college football sharply diverged from the message the Carnegie
Report hoped would reach the public. However, just as newspapers held an advantage in
readership, coaches benefitted from a large group of receptive fans. Both Savage and Pritchett
mourned the importance and prestige bestowed upon successful head football coaches by
universities, and local and national audiences. In a nation attracted to successful individuals such
as Charles Lindbergh or Henry Ford, Americans were more willing to listen to and accept the
views of a winning football coach instead of obscure educators attempting to reform athletics and
education.
Even outside the coaching ranks, criticism of the Carnegie Report rang loud. The Ohio
State Lantern’s student sports editor agreed with athletes, fans, and coaches that the Carnegie
Report was merely “hot air which a bunch of old fogies wanted to get off their chest.” The young
collegian was not alone, as a newspaper survey found that a majority of students on university
campuses proved relatively disinterested in the Carnegie Report. The remarks of the Ohio State
student writer, and the obvious disinterest of most college students, demonstrated the
disenchantment of 1920’s youth toward the message of the older, traditional-minded reformers.70
Furthermore, angry readers flooded newspapers with letters concerning their displeasure
regarding how the Carnegie Report treated their schools. A religious man, who claimed to have
been taught Chemistry by Knute Rockne at Notre Dame, referred to the report as a “sensational
story” that took “a sling at my Alma Mater which I cannot pass over in silence.” Moreover,
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reformers frequently utilized England’s University of Oxford as the definition of sincere amateur
athletics. In a letter to The New York Times, Kingsley Moses of East Hampton, New York took a
shot at the celebrated British school: “Gracious! Don’t you think the Carnegie Foundation ought
to bear down pretty hard on Oxford, where a couple of hundred students a year receive $2,000
scholarships for – to quote the late Cecil Rhodes – ‘physical vigor as shown by interest in
outdoor sports.’”71 A man interviewed by the Chicago Tribune stated: “I am a college man and I
think the Carnegie Foundation report is a lot of nonsense.”72
John Griffith was another individual who believed the Carnegie Reports to be nothing
more than rubbish. The Big Ten commissioner’s primary concern was a perceived lack of
objectivity regarding the researchers’ conclusions. According to Griffith, despite Dr. Savage
claiming that the committee intended to present both the merits and defects present in college
athletics, the fact that the “report deals almost entirely with defects” presented it as a deceptive
and ill-motivated study. Furthermore, the commissioner took offense at Dr. Pritchett’s stance in
the introduction that the university should serve solely as an “intellectual agency.” He
proclaimed that “Apparently, Dr. Pritchett does not believe that the university which offers
courses in business, banking, accounting, transportation, salesmanship, and journalism can teach
students to think clearly as well as a university that teaches only the subjects which were offered
in the earlier colleges,” which proved unfortunate for “the vocational idea of education.”
Furthermore, he challenged the Carnegie Foundation’s agenda by accusing Dr. Savage of posing

71

Religious man: Letter to the editor from Brother Gilbert C.S.C, “Subsidized Athletics” Times-Picayune, Oct. 24,
1929.
Moses: Letter to the editor from Kingsley Moses, “Other Athletic Scholarships” New York Times, Oct. 29, 1929.
College man: Sperber, Shake Down the Thunder, 308-309.

104

subjective questions and only utilizing the opinions of those who’s answers were negative
toward college athletics.”73
For Griffith personally, the committee’s findings proved particularly embarrassing, as the
investigators cited the Big Ten for numerous rules violations. The commissioner, who had
previously proclaimed the Big Ten as the cleanest conference in the country, held his ground and
instead blamed the claims on the misinformed research team. “I don’t believe the Carnegie
investigators have given a fair picture of Big Ten conditions,” argued Griffith. “We have nothing
to be ashamed of. I think that I am better informed of Big Ten athletic conditions than any
investigator for the Carnegie Foundation. And I honestly believe that the Western Intercollegiate
Conference universities are cleaner in regard to proselyting and subsidizing athletes than any one
may name.” 74
In a memorandum to Western Conference athletic directors and university presidents,
Griffith presented his personal commentary alongside excerpts from the Carnegie Report that
specifically condemned member schools or the conference as a whole. In a particularly direct
statement, Savage deemed the commissioner’s efforts to cleanup the Big Ten as unsuccessful. In
the margin of the memorandum sent to the athletic directors and presidents, Griffith curtly
responded, “one might enquire whether any attempt to improve human behavior had ever been
entirely successful.” In response to yet another passage specifically criticizing the conference’s
management of athletic subsidies, Griffith bluntly noted: “This is an asinine statement.”75
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Of particular interest was the report’s distinct reference to the Midwest. Savage not only
mentioned Griffith and/or the conference, but he also felt inclined to mention the Big Ten’s
connection to the Midwest. This notation could be gazed over if it occurred sporadically, but
references to region can be found throughout the report. Even more intriguing was the penchant
for comparing the football communities of various sections of the country. For example, Savage
criticizes the “(Mid-Western) Intercollegiate Conference” for hiring coaches from outside the
university to train specific sports rather than having the coaches of all teams performed by
members of its regular staff “like Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.” The report praises the “Big
Three’s” practice because it “permits the employment of men with due qualifications of skill and
of character without ‘a seat on the faculty’ to disguise their status as professional athletes.”76 By
specifying that the northeastern schools’ behavior were more acceptable than the Big Ten’s,
Savage imposed inferiority upon the midwestern football community.
In another instance, in response to the Savage’s claim that “in the Intercollegiate
Conference the cry is ‘We’ve got to have money,’” Griffith proclaimed that in contrast “to the
prevailing custom in the East,” the conference affiliates charge a low rate of admittance for
students into football games.77 Furthermore, Griffith conveyed his belief to Big Ten athletic
directors and presidents that not only had the investigators begun the report with a preconceived
“premise prejudicial to intercollegiate athletics,” but also that eastern universities influenced
their conclusions.78
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Griffith was not the only official critical of the practices of other regions. In 1930, when
Savage inquired to various college presidents if they had noticed a change in athletics since the
publication’s release, Yale President James Angell replied that he had not, but he had been given
information “of whose general correctness I find it difficult to doubt, indicating a very
unsatisfactory situation in the more important conferences in the Middle West ‘showing’ the
conditions in many of the more important institutions are still far from satisfactory.”79
Regarding infractions, the Midwest and the East were not the only football regions
specifically mentioned. In fact, when providing a list of the 130 schools visited for the report,
Savage presented the institutions by region. Cataloguing the schools by section of the country, as
opposed to alphabetically, by conference, or random order, demonstrates that region did in fact
matter. Furthermore, commentary suggesting that overemphasis of publicity agents occurred
“more frequently in the Middle West,” or implying that issues of eligibility tended to be more
troublesome on the Pacific Coast, instigated comparisons between regional football
communities.
Moreover, the Carnegie Report tended to bestow much more praise upon the eastern
section of the country in comparison to other regions. Savage even implied blame upon other
regions by claiming that the “businesslike procedure” of recruiting athletes, which became
commonplace in college football in the 1920s, did not occur until the game spread from the
Northeast to other sections of the country.80
Why did citizens react so furiously to critiques of their region? Savage commented on
this issue when discussing the nature of 1920s journalism:
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On the whole, however, it is not so much the college as the community in which it is
situated that to-day influences a newspaper’s policy in the treatment of college athletics,
for the community provides the circulation for the newspaper, and circulation is the
standard by which the success or failure of a sports-page policy is measured. In the
community must be reckoned those alumni whose blind partisanship leads them to protest
against friendly references to the teams or the sportsmanship of other
universities…Sometimes it is such men, as much as to local pride, and the subservience
of the local newspapers to both of these forces, that the commercial setting…is
ascribable.
In short, the desire to have one’s local team – an extension of personal identity – represented in
the most flattering light possible drove the commercial aspect of college football. A school’s
gridiron performance served as the extension of one’s self in the public sphere, so any poor
representation of a team was in turn a slight against the individuals of a regional football
community.
Some sports historians consider the Carnegie Report’s conclusions and commentary as a
transformative moment for college football in the twentieth century.81 The issue with this stance
is that it focuses primarily on the institutions themselves rather than the American public – the
force that influenced and was responsible for the commercial component of the game. While
deemphasizing the report is ill advised, its impact was not overly substantial. The public did not
appear to be swayed from their attraction to the sport: illegal recruiting and subsidizing
continued and persists today in some form or fashion. Moreover, in subsequent decades, the
amateur pursuit grew even more professional and commercial. College Football continued, and
has sustained, the status quo. While institutions certainly made efforts to reform, the public did
not.
Overall, the Carnegie Report failed at its intention – very little reform occurred in college
football. The game that Savage referred to as “Frankenstein Football,” continued its monstrous
81
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ways: larger stadiums, subsidizing athletics, commercialism, etc. The South’s Southeastern
Conference completely ignored the report’s recommendations and began offering athletic
scholarships in the 1930s. The amateur game continued to possess an economic component and,
in the ensuing decades, grew more professionalized. To the Carnegie Foundation’s dismay, a
majority of Americans continued to relate colleges more to their football teams than their
academic fortitude.
Furthermore, in regards to the aftermath of the Carnegie Report, if winners and losers
were assigned, college football reformers came in a decisive second place. Specifically, no
significant efforts were taken by athletic conferences and teams to redefine the sport as an
amateur pursuit. Broadly, the eastern intellectual elite who compromised a large portion of
reformers failed to stall the influence of modernity upon the United States. In the 1920s, eastern
academic institutions steadily lost influence upon American society in the wake of an
increasingly more modern and professionalized United States. The Carnegie Report served as yet
another failed attempt by eastern academic intellectuals to stop the inevitable.
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Conclusion
In an article written for The North American Review, H.W. Whicker described the
immense pressure American society imposed upon college football teams:
The team must win. The American public does not patronize a loser. The American
public does not tolerate a loser. If the team does not win, it loses its advertising and
publicity value; and the institution itself, its city, and its district fade from the sport sheet
and are no longer heard of in national broadcasts.1
In the 1920s, numerous Americans felt similar to the outcaste football teams Whicker
claimed the public chastised – they felt like losers. Over the course of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, personal autonomy disappeared due to the bureaucratic orientation that
engulfed nearly all aspects of American society. As a more centralized and administrativeminded United States emitted uniformity upon industry, language, and politics – previously
diverse aspects of society – national disparity slowly disappeared. While the rigid organization
improved the efficiency of everyday life, in this atmosphere of homogeneity, Americans lost
distinct characteristics that separated them from others around the country – self-identity
diminished.
In an effort to recapture any sense of individuality, citizens grasped for unique qualities
that would invoke sentiments of distinction – local college football emerged as an improbable
solution to their cause. Because of an increase in reputable teams across the United States,
amplified media coverage, and increased interest from fans, college football developed into a
truly national sport. Rather than replicating the homogeneity experienced by other aspects of
American culture, when college football encountered nationalization in the 1920s, regionalism
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emerged due to the competitive nature of the sport – comparison upon nearly all issues
associated with the game became possible.
Due to America’s ties to capitalism, the nation proved innately competitive and thus
determined to name winners and losers in all aspects of society.2 In a homogenous business
community, the average American’s ability to ascend above fellow citizens proved difficult.
However, through the satisfaction of victory, college football provided an opportunity to propel
an individual’s self-worth above that of their peers.
A sense of superiority was dependent upon the success of one’s local football
community. As Whicker explained, if a team lost, its national reputation diminished and a sense
of personal inferiority resulted. In the 1929 Carnegie Report, Dr. Howard Savage described a
similar sentiment: “In many instances the state of mind commonly referred to as an inferiority
complex is the root of the desire for athletic notoriety, whether in the individual or in the
group.”3 Throughout this study it has been shown that Americans’ efforts to defend their
respective local teams were a direct result of a perceived challenge, whether positive or negative,
to the national reputation of one’s local football community. When such regional characteristics
were threatened, individuals felt as if their personal self-identity was being questioned as well. In
short, nationalism perpetuated regionalism and self-identity.
Because of a more connected society in post-World War I America, many assume that
regionalism dissipated.4 When observing the actions of football supporters during the decade, it
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becomes apparent that the positive promotion of one’s regional football community – a
heterogeneous action –proved essential. Thus, as is shown through society’s reaction to 1920s
college football, regionalism did not simply disappear in the face of a more homogenous
American society – it was prolonged and became as strong as ever.
Moreover, in the 1920s, the promotion of a successful regional football community
transcended above all other concerns associated with the collegiate game. When fans discussed
which deserving athletes failed to receive recognition from the Walter Camp All-American team
or what schools the media slighted in postseason rankings, rarely was the scholastic standing of
the student-athlete ever discussed. Seldom would Grantland Rice receive letters of concern
regarding the academic integrity of college football; rather, anguish arose because one’s football
region did not receive enough respect. When southwestern football fans praised the Southern
Methodist Mustang’s extraordinary improvement during the 1920s, most cited style of play as
the reason for their success. Supporters rarely mentioned the illegal recruiting of athletes, many
of whom were academically ineligible, that nearly had the Mustangs booted from the Southwest
Conference following the 1922 season. If a region, or college football itself, confronted negative
publicity, a majority of the public immediately refuted the accusations and the attacks on the
game were usually forgotten as quickly as they had emerged.
In the 1920s, the American public proved infatuated with college football, and anything
beside a positive portrayal of the game and its regional football communities was unacceptable.
Commercialism and professionalization, two forces the 1929 Carnegie Report concluded had
ruined the sport, proved indispensible components of college football during the decade.
However, in order for these forces to continue driving the progression of the collegiate game, the
amateur nature of the sport and its emphasis on the scholastic component of the university
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proved unproductive. Thus, in comparison to rewarding individual athletic accomplishments,
such as placement on the Walter Camp All-American team, academic integrity was a distant
concern. Educational concerns went to the wayside not because institutions no longer cared, but
rather because society aligned more with that which the Carnegie Foundation loathed: a
competitive, business-driven environment.
Furthermore, many sports historians commenting on college football focus on
institutions. This can serve as a grave mistake. Ultimately, the power of college football as a
cultural entity is its ability to illuminate particular aspects of American society and the
sentiments of individual citizens. Thus, when studying the history of college football, scholars
must attempt to observe how the stories impacted individual players and fans – how did they
react to certain situations and what issues proved most important to them. It becomes obvious
from letters, newspaper clippings, and various other primary sources, that as 1920s college
football nationalized, individual citizens sought to promote that which made them unique from
other football fans in a more connected national football community: regional identity.
Moreover, many of college football’s athletic achievements celebrated by the public were
individual in nature. Coaches such as Knute Rockne and Ray Morrison were revered and athletes
like Illinois’s Red Grange and Stanford’s Ernie Nevers ascended above their respective teams.
1920s American society celebrated individual stars more so than any previous decade and this
characteristic can largely be attributed to a craving for autonomy. In an increasingly homogenous
nation, self-worth became desirable. And just as citizens utilized positive recognition of their
regional football communities for a sense of superiority amongst their peers, they distinguished
the athletic figures that transcended the rest of the athletic community. In this environment, it
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makes sense that Americans would celebrate, and attempt to replicate, a characteristic they
desperately craved: individual success.
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